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ABSTRACT 
  This Article examines proportionality as a constitutional limitation 
on the power to punish. In the criminal context, proportionality is 
often mischaracterized as a specifically penological theory—an ideal 
linked to specific accounts of the purpose of punishment. In fact, a 
constitutional proportionality requirement is better understood as an 
external limitation on the state’s penal power that is independent of 
the goals of punishment. Proportionality limitations on the penal 
power arise not from the purposes of punishment, but from the fact 
that punishing is not the only purpose that the state must pursue. 
Other considerations, especially the protection of individual interests 
in liberty and equality, restrict the pursuit of penological goals. 
Principles of proportionality put the limits into any theory of 
 limited government, and proportionality in the sentencing context is 
just one instance of these limitations on state power. This 
understanding of proportionality gives reason to doubt the assertion 
that determinations of proportionality are necessarily best left to 
legislatures. In doctrinal contexts other than criminal sentencing, 
proportionality is frequently used as a mechanism of judicial review 
to prevent legislative encroachments on individual rights and other 
exercises of excessive power. In the criminal sentencing context, a 
constitutional proportionality requirement should serve as a limit on 
penal power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Incarceration and capital punishment involve direct exercises of 
force against the human body that occur almost nowhere else in 
domestic politics in a liberal state. Because liberal democratic 
governments trace their legitimacy to something other than superior 
physical force, and because liberal democratic governments claim to 
protect the lives and liberties of their subjects, the imposition of these 
sanctions may be one of the most illiberal practices of a liberal state. 
For a variety of reasons, penal sanctions are often practically and 
perhaps morally necessary. But punishment’s inherent tension with 
liberal ideals suggests a need for principled restrictions on the scope 
of the penal power. 
In fact, few such restrictions apply to American sentencing 
practices. Nominally, the Supreme Court considers the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments” to 
require that penalties be proportionate to offenses.1 But that 
proportionality requirement has been attenuated in recent years. 
Only a minimal proportionality principle seems to restrict a legislature 
as it prescribes the range of sentences for a given crime. In March 
2003, the Supreme Court found that lengthy prison sentences 
mandated by California’s “three strikes” law did not violate the 
proportionality requirement of the Eighth Amendment, even if those 
 
 1. The proportionality requirement of the Eighth Amendment was first recognized by the 
United States Supreme Court in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910) (striking down 
a criminal sentence as “cruel in its excess of imprisonment”); see also id. at 367 (“[I]t is a precept 
of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.”). 
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sentences were imposed for seemingly minor offenses such as 
shoplifting three golf clubs or the theft of approximately $150 worth 
of children’s videotapes.2 In Blakely v. Washington3 and United States 
v. Booker,4 the Court found some aspects of state and federal 
sentencing guidelines—guidelines that originated as legislative efforts 
to ensure proportionality in judicial sentencing—unconstitutional 
under the Sixth Amendment.5 Although sentencing guidelines are 
typically aimed more at consistency (proportionality relative to other 
sentences) and less at restrictions on severity (proportionality relative 
to the instant criminal offense), the concerns of the Blakely and 
Booker Courts about which decisionmakers are involved in the 
sentencing process are linked to concerns about the severity of 
criminal sentences. In both cases, marginal increases in severity 
triggered the Court’s constitutional scrutiny of the defendants’ 
sentences.6 Further, regardless of one’s view of the conceptual 
underpinnings of the Court’s rejection of mandatory sentencing 
guidelines, that rejection provides the occasion for extensive revisions 
to federal and state criminal sentencing law. Rethinking sentencing in 
the wake of Blakely and Booker should prompt reconsideration of the 
constitutional status of proportionality. 
This Article examines proportionality as a limitation of state 
power in a constitutional liberal democracy. One source of confusion 
 
 2. E.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (upholding a sentence of two 
consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life for petty theft of nine videotapes); Ewing v. 
California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003) (upholding a sentence of twenty-five years to life for felony 
theft of golf clubs). 
 3. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). 
 4. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
 5. The Court’s somewhat unusual Booker decision did not strike down the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines altogether. Id. at 738. One majority found that the Sixth Amendment 
prohibited applications of the Guidelines to increase a defendant’s sentence solely on the basis 
of facts found by a judge rather than a jury. Id. at 749–51. A second majority held that the 
appropriate remedy was to strike down only the provision of the Sentencing Reform Act 
making the Guidelines mandatory; under the newly advisory Guidelines system, the maximum 
penalties for most federal offenses are much higher and judicial fact-finding does not increase 
sentences above an otherwise applicable legal ceiling. Id. at 756–57. Justice Ginsburg was the 
only Justice in both majorities. 
 6. As explained in greater detail in Part III, infra, recent Sixth Amendment sentencing 
decisions promise at the minimum certain procedural protections against disproportionate 
sentences. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 
(2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The same decisions may also assume a 
substantive proportionality requirement, but that reading is more debatable, and the 
constitutional home of a substantive proportionality requirement is more likely to be the Eighth 
Amendment or the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
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about proportionality in the criminal context has been the 
characterization of proportionality as an ideal linked to particular 
theoretical accounts of the purpose of punishment—usually, 
retributive accounts. In fact, proportionality is better understood as 
an external limitation on the state’s power to incarcerate or execute 
individuals, and this limitation applies whether the state is punishing 
to exact retribution, to deter, to incapacitate, or (as is most often the 
case) to pursue some amalgam of ill-defined and possibly conflicting 
purposes. 
Much turns on whether proportionality is understood as limited 
to penal purposes or as independent of those purposes. The 
arguments most frequently raised against a proportionality 
requirement for criminal sentences focus on institutional competence, 
legislative prerogative, and the difficulty of developing an objective 
standard.7 To a significant degree, these arguments depend on the 
assumption that proportionality is inextricably linked to a theory of 
penal purpose. For example, concerns about institutional competence 
have more force if one thinks that proportionality review requires an 
inevitably partisan choice among competing penological theories. But 
if proportionality review is an attempt to specify the outer limits of 
the penal power—not an attempt to direct the legislature’s choices 
within the boundaries of that power—the institutional competence 
challenge to proportionality review is less persuasive. Of course, 
judicially imposed limits on legislative action will sometimes have 
countermajoritarian consequences and will thus continue to be 
controversial. But courts and scholars have tended to overstate the 
degree to which proportionality review requires judges to meddle in 
affairs traditionally and properly left to legislative bodies.8 
At present, both proportionality concerns and other sentencing 
issues enjoy considerable judicial and academic attention.9 The 
 
 7. See infra notes 193–215 and accompanying text. 
 8. For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted a principle of “legislative 
primacy” as a reason for the judiciary to avoid searching proportionality review. See, e.g., 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing “the primacy 
of the legislature” as one of four principles commanding judicial deference on questions of 
proportionality); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275 (1980) (stating that proportionality 
determinations involve a “basic line-drawing process that is pre-eminently the province of the 
legislature”). 
 9. At about the same time that the Supreme Court announced a minimal Eighth 
Amendment proportionality guarantee in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 21 (2003) (but 
before the Supreme Court decisions in Blakely and Booker), the American Law Institute issued 
a report on proposed changes to the sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code (MPC). 
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Supreme Court’s retreat from proportionality review of prison 
sentences has coincided with a more searching proportionality review 
of death sentences10 and of civil punitive damage awards.11 Several 
recent articles discuss this apparent inconsistency.12 Most of the recent 
commentators on proportionality in the criminal sentencing context 
argue, as I do, for a constitutional proportionality requirement that is 
broader than the minimalist standard that the Court currently 
 
MODEL PENAL CODE 1–6 (Sentencing Report 2003) [hereinafter MPC SENTENCING REPORT]. 
This report criticized the existing MPC sentencing provisions for omitting a proportionality 
requirement. Id. at 34–36. The Eighth Amendment proportionality debates seem to have been 
overshadowed, at least temporarily, by the controversy over the Court’s recent cases requiring 
all facts determinative of sentence severity to be found by juries (or admitted by defendants) 
rather than found by judges. I argue that although these jury sentencing decisions do not use the 
language of proportionality, the Court’s concern with marginal increases in the severity of 
sentences suggests an implicit assumption that sentences will be proportionate to offenses. See 
infra Part III. The commentary on Blakely is already voluminous, and Booker is likely to ensure 
that scholars focus on Sixth Amendment sentencing issues for some time. The academy’s 
reaction to Blakely is evident in the titles of some of the earliest articles to address the decision. 
See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, The Blakely Earthquake and Its Aftershocks, 16 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 307 (2004); Frank O. Bowman, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be 
Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217 (2004). 
 10. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005) (holding that the death penalty is 
disproportionate punishment for offenders under eighteen years of age at the time of the 
offense); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317–19 (2002) (holding that the death penalty is an 
excessive punishment for mentally retarded offenders). 
 11. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (reversing a 
judgment for $145 million in punitive damages on the grounds that the award “was neither 
reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed”); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996) (reversing a judgment for $2 million in punitive damages as “grossly 
excessive”). 
 12. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 
1070–79 (2004) (arguing for both procedural consistency and a unified approach to 
proportionality for all forms of punishment); Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, 
Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. 
L. REV. 571, 607–09 (2005) (arguing that the “retributive proportionality” and “utilitarian 
proportionality” limits placed on punitive damage awards by the Supreme Court could be used 
similarly to define constitutional limits on prison sentences); Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the 
Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. 
REV. 880, 882–83 (2004) (arguing that a proportionality determination is inherently subjective 
and that the Supreme Court gives more decisionmaking authority to juries in criminal 
sentencing than punitive damage awards because criminal punishments are institutionally 
limited by the role of the executive in a criminal proceeding); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional 
Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 699 n.102 (2005) (noting the tension 
between the Court’s disparate use of proportionality in the Eighth Amendment cases and the 
Due Process cases); Rachel A. Van Cleave, “Death Is Different,” Is Money Different? Criminal 
Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages—Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for 
Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 217, 272–78 (2003) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court should apply consistent criteria to all forms of punishment, regardless of 
whether that punishment is a deprivation of life, liberty, or property). 
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applies.13 But these advocates of proportionality review have 
damaged their own cause by linking proportionality to particular 
penological theories.14 By divorcing proportionality from 
considerations of penal purpose, I offer a response to the concern 
about institutional competence. A central challenge of this Article is 
to find a way to specify the limits of the penal power without adopting 
a particular theory of the justification of that power. 
An argument for a not-specifically-penological principle of 
proportionality might run thus: The power to incarcerate or execute is 
not absolute. It is always limited by general political principles—such 
as respect for individual liberty and equality—that stand independent 
of penal purposes. More specifically, each individual’s interest in 
liberty means that restrictions on liberty must be proportionate to the 
conduct that allegedly justifies the restriction. The power to punish15 
does not even exist absent certain conditions: this power comes into 
being only after an individual engages in specific conduct that has 
been criminalized.16 When the power to punish comes into being, it is 
 
 13. Most arguments for proportionality review are variants of the call for the 
“constitutionalization” of substantive criminal law, a call famously made by Henry M. Hart 
almost 50 years ago and subsequently echoed by many others. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims 
of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 409–11 (1958); Herbert L. Packer, The 
Aims of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at “Substantive Due Process,” 44 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 490, 494–95 (1970) (arguing for the subjection of criminal sanctions to a rational 
basis test that focuses on economic costs and moral arguments, particularly for so-called 
victimless crimes); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 29–38 (1996) (arguing that constitutional limits on criminal 
substance, such as a rule against strict liability or a doctrine of desuetude, would prevent the 
manipulation, and ultimately the impotence, of constitutional limits on criminal procedure). 
These calls have gone unheeded for the most part. General constitutional restrictions on the 
substantive criminal law are, like proportionality review, often rejected by courts as improper 
judicial meddling in matters of legislative prerogative. For an overview of the failed quest for a 
substantive constitutional criminal law, see Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and 
Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1272–99 (1998). 
 14. See, e.g., Frase, supra note 12, at 588–596 (finding proportionality requirements in both 
retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment); Lee, supra note 12, at 704–709 (arguing that 
the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments establishes a retributive proportionality 
principle as a side constraint on the power to punish). 
 15. The power to punish is composed of subsidiary powers exercised by various state 
actors. The power to authorize punishment in the first instance—the power to define activity as 
criminal—is distinct from the power to impose punishment. The first power is exercised by the 
legislature against all those subject to the criminal laws. The second power is exercised by the 
judiciary and then by the executive, and it is exercised only against those individuals who are 
convicted and sentenced, and who actually serve their sentences. 
 16. This principle underpins the void-for-vagueness doctrine of Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). The Papachristou Court explicitly rejected legislative 
authorization of a generalized power to punish: “It would certainly be dangerous if the 
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not unlimited. What I will call liberty-interest proportionality is thus 
based on a claim that the scope of the penal power (and of the 
subsidiary powers exercised by the legislative, judicial, and executive 
branches) bears some relation to the conduct that gives rise to this 
power. This understanding of proportionality in criminal sentencing is 
parallel to proportionality requirements in a variety of other contexts. 
Proportionality is often invoked to limit an exercise of state power 
according to the scope of the conduct or injury that the state seeks to 
address.17 
Similarly, each individual in a liberal democracy has an interest 
in equal treatment before the law. Equality-interest proportionality is 
the requirement that similarly situated defendants convicted of 
similar crimes receive similar sentences. This type of proportionality 
seems to be more widely accepted than liberty-interest 
proportionality; it was equality-interest proportionality that 
motivated the federal government and many states to adopt the 
sentencing guidelines approaches that Blakely and Booker have now 
rejected.18 Equality-interest proportionality is perhaps more 
accurately called uniformity,19 but to follow common practice, I will 
refer to uniformity as a variant of proportionality.20 
Part I reviews a number of theoretical accounts of 
proportionality in punishment to distinguish between specifically 
penological arguments for proportionality and more general political 
arguments for proportionality. The Supreme Court uses the term 
penological to refer to theoretical accounts of punishment that 
 
legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts 
to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.” Id. at 
165 (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875)).  
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2540 (2004) (citing Wash. Rev. Code 
9.94A (2000)) (noting that Washington’s sentencing guidelines were based on concerns about 
“proportionality to the gravity of the offense and parity among defendants”); see also Stephen 
Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1988) (noting Congressional intent to reduce sentencing disparities 
among similarly situated defendants). 
 19. One of the architects of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, then Circuit Judge Stephen 
Breyer, described “uniformity and proportionality” as central (but competing) goals of a 
sentencing system. “Uniformity essentially means treating similar cases alike,” whereas 
proportionality, as Breyer described it, requires “treat[ing] different cases differently.” Breyer, 
supra note 18, at 13. In other words, uniformity requires that all similarly situated murderers get 
similar sentences, and proportionality requires that murders and thefts be punished differently. 
 20. See infra note 162 for a discussion of Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), and 
“comparative proportionality review.” 
032006 02_RISTROPH.DOC 4/24/2006  12:27 PM 
270 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:263 
include claims about the appropriate purpose of punishment; I use 
the word in the same way. Political arguments for proportionality 
consider the structure and justification of the entire political system, 
not just the specific practice of punishment.21 Political proportionality 
is, in essence, the consequence of the limits of penological theory—
given society’s commitments to political ideals unrelated to the 
problem of crime, any justification of punishment will go only so far. 
Part II shifts the focus from theory to constitutional doctrine to 
examine political proportionality in an array of constitutional 
contexts. With respect to incarceration and capital punishment, the 
Supreme Court has created only minimal requirements of liberty-
interest proportionality, but has been somewhat more inclined to 
require equality-interest proportionality. When neither imprisonment 
nor execution is at stake, the Court has been considerably more 
supportive of proportionality requirements. The Court has been 
especially solicitous to what might be called property-interest 
proportionality—limitations on state power to take property from 
civil or criminal litigants. 
After examining the conceptual basis of political proportionality 
in Part I, and the doctrinal support for political proportionality in Part 
II, this Article turns, in Part III, to consider how one might 
implement political proportionality in the criminal sentencing 
context. One source of inspiration may be the jurisprudence of 
constitutional criminal procedure, in which limitations on the penal 
power are not dependent upon the state’s purpose in punishing. 
Instead, courts have viewed the law of criminal procedure as an 
external limitation on the power to punish. Proportionality, I argue, is 
best understood as a similar external limitation. To implement a 
proportionality requirement without reference to penological 
purpose, one might look to Booker and other recent Sixth 
Amendment sentencing decisions that insist on a close link between 
proven criminal conduct and the imposed sentence. Conduct is much 
better suited than penology to serve as the determinant of the outer 
limits of the power to punish. 
 
 21. As explained in more detail below, this proportionality principle is political in the sense 
that it relates to the distribution of government power within a political system. See infra pp. 
284–87. It is not “political” in the way that many legal scholars like to use that adjective: 
majoritarian and/or partisan (as in “the political branches”). 
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I.  THE LIMITS OF PENOLOGICAL THEORY 
Proportionality is often conflated with the principle of just 
deserts.22 For example, Justice Scalia has argued that the Eighth 
Amendment contains no “guarantee against disproportionate 
sentences”23 because proportionality “is inherently a concept tied to 
the penological goal of retribution,”24 and the Constitution “does not 
mandate adoption of any one penological theory.”25 It is certainly the 
case that the requirement that punishments be proportional to 
offenses has been articulated most often in the context of particular 
penological theories. It is not the case that proportionality is 
defended more extensively by retributive theories than by any other 
penal theory; nor is it the case that proportionality depends on any 
particular view of the purpose of punishment. In this Part, I examine 
arguments for proportionality as they appear in a range of theories of 
punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and 
retribution. Many philosophical accounts of the proportionality 
principle entail two separate requirements: a floor, or a minimum 
amount of punishment for a given crime, and a ceiling, or a maximum 
punishment for the crime. Although the various arguments for a floor 
are linked to the particular penal purpose embraced by the theory, 
the arguments for a ceiling are often based on broader political 
principles of utility, individual rights, or human dignity. Accordingly, 
proportionality as a ceiling on punishment can and should be 
understood as a limitation on government power that is independent 
of any specific penological theory. I refer to this nonpenological 
principle as political proportionality.26 Political proportionality is 
compatible with a range of penological theories, but it is not 
dependent on any one of them. 
 
 22. See, e.g., Hyman Gross, Proportional Punishment and Justifiable Sentences, in 
SENTENCING 272 (Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981) (“The principle of 
proportion between crime and punishment is a principle of just desert that serves as the 
foundation of every criminal sentence that is justifiable.”). 
 23. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 985 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. (quoting id. at 25 (plurality opinion) (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))). 
 26. See infra text accompanying note 81. 
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A. Utilitarian Proportionality 
The most sustained and detailed arguments for proportional 
punishments come not from retributive theorists, but from their 
philosophical adversaries: advocates of utilitarian theories of 
punishment. 
Jeremy Bentham is known as the father of utilitarianism and as a 
leading theorist of punishment, but on both counts he owes much to 
Cesare Beccaria. The Italian Beccaria published his best-known work, 
Of Crimes and Punishments, when Bentham was only sixteen (though 
already graduating from Oxford).27 In that book, Beccaria argues that 
government and justice must be based on the principle of utility—the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number.28 Though this phrase is 
commonly attributed to Bentham as the “fundamental axiom” of 
utilitarianism, it is a translation of Beccaria’s “la massima felicita 
divisa nel maggior numero.”29 The familiar invocation of “pleasure 
and pain” as the “moving powers of sentient beings” was also used 
first by Beccaria.30 
Utilitarianism is, of course, a theory of politics that reaches far 
beyond the practice of punishment. Though Beccaria’s short treatise 
is focused primarily on crime and punishment, it articulates broad 
political principles that apply to the structure of government more 
generally. Penal institutions and practices are only a subset of the 
institutions and practices that make up a political system. Beccaria 
clearly considers punishment as part of a larger political context, and 
consequently, he offers two different kinds of arguments for 
proportional punishments. He sometimes argues for proportional 
punishments on specifically penological grounds—on the basis of the 
special purpose of punishment—but more often, he argues for 
proportionality on broader political grounds. 
 
 27. CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Jane Grigson trans., Marsilio 
Publishers 1996) (1764). Both Beccaria and Bentham were prodigies of sorts; Beccaria was only 
twenty-five when he wrote Of Crimes and Punishments, which was first published in 1764. 
Jeremy Bentham was admitted to the bar at age twenty-one in 1769 and allegedly began to read 
Beccaria at about that time. See Ross Harrison, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, A 
FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT x (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) 
(1776); see also Principal events in Bentham’s life, in BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT, supra, at xxiv. 
 28. See BECCARIA, supra note 27, at 77. 
 29. Harrison, supra note 27, at vi, xiv. 
 30. BECCARIA, supra note 27, at 74. 
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Beccaria rejects retributive theories of punishment and argues 
for a system of publicly engineered penalties that would deter crimes 
and generate greater utility: 
[T]he purpose of punishments is neither to torture and afflict a 
sentient creature nor undo a crime already done. . . . The aim, then, 
of punishment can only be to prevent the criminal committing new 
crimes against his countrymen, and to keep others from doing 
likewise. Punishments, therefore, and the method of inflicting them, 
should be chosen in due proportion to the crime so as to make the 
most efficacious and lasting impression on the minds of men, and the 
least painful impressions on the body of the criminal.31 
Punishment must be severe enough to create a “lasting impression on 
the minds of men,” but not so severe that it becomes torture. In other 
words, Beccaria’s proportionality requirement can be conceptualized 
as two subsidiary requirements, each with a separate justification. The 
minimum punishment, or the floor, is determined by deterrence 
concerns. But the ceiling on punishment is an antitorture principle 
that is based on humanist concerns rather than calculations of 
torture’s efficacy as a deterrent.32 
Beccaria’s objections to cruelty, and thus his call for a ceiling on 
the sanction, stem from general principles of human dignity and 
individual freedom.33 Put differently, utility maximization is not 
Beccaria’s only concern: “[T]hough a punishment may have a good 
 
 31. BECCARIA, supra note 27, at 49 (emphasis added); see also id. at 74 (“Therefore the 
obstacles to crimes should be stronger according to the degree in which those crimes are 
contrary to the public good, and the degree of incentives which causes them.”). But see Morris 
B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 996 n.164 (2003) (“Cesare 
Beccaria is generally credited with the first rigorous exposition of proportionality as a theorem 
of retribution.”). Although Beccaria does not use the language of retribution, Judge Hoffman 
seems to assume that because Beccaria insists on guilt, he is necessarily a retributivist. After all, 
a typical complaint lodged against utilitarian theories of punishment is that in some 
circumstances, they would permit a state to punish an innocent person as a scapegoat. But guilt 
is not an exclusively retributive notion. There is a difference between the claim that the guilty 
must be punished and the claim that only the guilty can be punished. Retributivists typically 
make both claims, but many nonretributivists make the latter claim. See also infra Part III for a 
discussion of constitutional guilt. 
 32. Beccaria does argue at one point that torture is ineffective, BECCARIA, supra note 27, 
at 35–40, but he makes this claim to criticize the practice of investigative torture, not to 
denounce excessive sentences. 
 33. For Beccaria, human dignity, individual freedom, and utilitarianism are not mutually 
exclusive. He says that if he can demonstrate that the death penalty is “neither useful nor 
necessary,” he will “have won the cause of humanity.” Id. at 53. I emphasize his concerns for 
individual freedom and human dignity here only to show that his objections to excessive 
punishments are not strictly deterrence-based. 
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result, it is not on that account always just; to be just a punishment 
must be necessary . . . .”34 Of Crimes and Punishments is filled with 
references to the cruelty of extant penal practices.35 Cruelty is 
“useless,” but beyond its disutility, it provokes in Beccaria “horror 
and disgust.”36 Beccaria remains aware of a truth often forgotten by 
those who view punishment as a moral and constructive activity: 
every act of punishment, justified or not, is an interference with 
individual freedom. “Everything beyond” what is necessary to deter 
“is superfluous, and therefore tyrannical.”37 The ceiling on acceptable 
punishment is a restriction on excessive, tyrannical government 
power. In fact, Beccaria concludes his essay with the claim that it is 
(in part) proportionality that distinguishes punishment from violence: 
“In order that punishment should never be an act of violence 
committed by one or many against a private citizen, it is essential that 
it be . . . as little as the circumstances will allow, proportionate to the 
crime, and established by law.”38 
In contrast to these general political claims, some of Beccaria’s 
arguments for proportionality depend on his particular account of the 
purpose of punishment. For example, he argues that different crimes 
must be punished differently, or would-be offenders will have no 
incentive to limit themselves to the least harmful offenses. This 
particular demand for proportionality is based on specific penological 
assumptions: that punishment aims to deter, and that altering 
incentives will change the behavior of would-be wrongdoers. Thus, 
adumbrating yet another of Bentham’s themes, Beccaria argues that 
the death penalty is objectionable because it is too crude an 
instrument; it cannot be adjusted to fit the particular offense. No wise 
government should apply the same penalty to “the man who kills a 
 
 34. Id. at 62. 
 35. See, e.g., id. at 8 (“[V]ery few men have examined and set themselves against the 
cruelty of punishments and the irregularity of criminal procedure . . . .”); id. at 29 (“Among the 
evident yet time-honored abuses . . . must be counted the custom of leveling secret 
accusations.”); id. at 34 (“The torture of an accused man while the case against him is being 
prepared is a cruelty consecrated by long usage among the majority of nations . . . .”). 
 36. Id. at 49. 
 37. Id. at 50; see also id. at 119 (“In order that punishment should never be an act of 
violence . . . it is essential that it be . . . as little as circumstance will allow, proportionate to the 
crime, and established by law.”). 
 38. Id. at 119 (emphasis omitted). 
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pheasant, the man who murders another man, or the man who 
falsifies an important document . . . .”39 
This last argument for proportionality is a specifically penological 
argument in the sense that it is based on a claim about the purpose of 
punishment. Similarly, Beccaria’s argument for a floor or minimum is 
also a penological argument. But most of Beccaria’s arguments for a 
ceiling on the permissible sanctions for a given crime are political 
arguments that do not require acceptance of a deterrence theory of 
punishment. 
On the implementation of his proportionality principle, Beccaria 
is somewhat vague. 
Were geometry adaptable to the infinite and obscure combinations 
of the actions of men, doubtless there would be a corresponding 
scale of punishments which would descend from the [most severe] to 
the lightest . . . . But the wise legislator will be content to indicate 
the chief divisions on the scale without upsetting its order and 
inflicting punishments of the lowest degree for crimes of the first 
degree.40 
Adapting geometry to “the infinite and obscure combinations of 
the actions of men” is, of course, Bentham’s delight. With occasional 
nods to Beccaria, Bentham devises a sort of moral mathematics both 
for proportionality in punishment and for utilitarianism more 
generally. Pleasures and pains are the instruments with which the 
legislator must work, and these instruments can be measured 
according to four primary qualities: intensity, duration, certainty (or 
uncertainty), and propinquity (or remoteness).41 It is unnecessary to 
address here Bentham’s lengthy instructions on how to use these 
 
 39. Id. at 74. Beccaria frequently acknowledges his debt to Montesquieu, see, e.g., id. at 9, 
and on this point Montesquieu’s influence seems particularly clear. 
It is an essential point that there should be a certain proportion in punishments, 
because it is essential that a great crime should be avoided rather than a smaller . . . . 
. . . . 
In China, those who add murder to robbery are cut in pieces: but not so the others; to 
this difference it is owing that though they rob in that country they never murder. 
In Russia, where the punishment of robbery and murder is the same, they always 
murder. 
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 89–90 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner 
Publ’g 1962) (1748). 
 40. BECCARIA, supra note 27, at 75–76. 
 41. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 29 (Prometheus 
Books 1988) (1781). 
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qualities (as well as two subsidiary qualities, fecundity and purity42) to 
conduct a utilitarian analysis of any human act. Instead, consider 
Bentham’s rules for allocating the pain of punishment to individual 
offenses. Bentham is even more explicit than Beccaria in his 
description of proportionality as a number of separate requirements, 
some mandating a minimum punishment, others determining a 
maximum punishment. 
The first rule of proportionality (for which Bentham cites 
Beccaria) requires that “[t]he value of the punishment must not be 
less in any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of 
the offence.”43 Bentham explains further that when assessing 
proportionality, it is necessary to consider the “value” of punishment 
rather than its “quantity”: “For the word quantity will not properly 
include the circumstances either of certainty or proximity . . . .”44 And 
the quantity of punishment is itself composed of two separate factors: 
intensity and duration.45 
Bentham identifies several other rules: greater “mischiefs” 
should incur greater penalties; punishments should be incrementally 
increased to give would-be mischief doers an incentive to do as little 
mischief as possible; punishment ought never to be “more than what 
is necessary” to deter in accordance with the rules previously 
specified; and punishments for similar crimes should be roughly 
similar, taking into account the particular circumstances of the 
individual offender.46 Most of these rules, Bentham recognizes, “mark 
out the limits . . . below which a punishment ought not to be 
diminished.”47 Only the rule that punishments ought not to exceed 
“what is necessary” specifies “the limits on the side of increase.”48 Or, 
to use the terminology I invoked earlier, there are reasons for a 
 
 42. Id. at 30–32. 
 43. Id. at 179. 
 44. Id. at 183. 
 45. Id. at 187. These various elements of the value of punishment suggest a weakness in any 
proportionality analysis that looks only at the length of a prison term—and not at the prison 
conditions and other variables that can affect the severity of a particular individual’s 
punishment. 
 46. Id. at 182. Different individuals will experience similar penalties as different degrees of 
hardship, Bentham argues. “The same nominal punishment is not, for different individuals, the 
same real punishment.” JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW (1771), reprinted in 1 
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 401 (John Bowring ed., 1843) [hereinafter BENTHAM, 
PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW]. 
 47. BENTHAM, supra note 41, at 182. 
 48. Id. 
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punishment floor, and there are (possibly different) reasons for a 
ceiling.49 
As with Beccaria, Bentham’s arguments for minimum 
punishment are linked to the specific purpose of punishment 
(deterrence), but his insistence on a maximum permissible 
punishment is often based on a broader political claim about pain as 
disutility. “Punishment, whatever shape it may assume, is an evil.”50 
Error on the minimum side “is least likely to occur,” but overly 
severe punishment “is that to which legislators and men in general are 
naturally inclined.”51 The maximum limit on punishment, a rule to be 
enforced in most cases by judges in review of legislatures,52 is the 
proportionality rule for which “we should take the most 
precautions.”53 
Proportionality is thus well-established within deterrence 
theories of punishment. But two other oft-cited utilitarian purposes of 
punishment, incapacitation and rehabilitation, seem to lack any 
internal proportionality principle.54 In fact, the American Law 
Institute’s recent Sentencing Report blames the separate pursuits of 
incapacitation and rehabilitation for disproportionately severe 
criminal sentences imposed in the United States today.55 If sentencing 
policymakers invoked utilitarian principles consistently, however, the 
same political arguments for an upper limit on punishment advanced 
by Beccaria and Bentham would apply to a penal system that seeks to 
incapacitate or rehabilitate offenders. 
 
 49. See BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW, supra note 46, at 399 (“Punishments may 
be too small or too great; and there are reasons for not making them too small, as well as for not 
making them too great.”). 
 50. Id. at 390. 
 51. Id. at 401. Bentham here suggests a possible response to those who would resist 
proportionality review on procedural justice grounds—those who argue that criminal laws 
produced by majoritarian political procedures must not be second-guessed by activist judges. 
Criminal sentencing may be an area in which democratic processes are likely to produce unjust 
results. See infra Part III. 
 52. BENTHAM, supra note 41, at 182. 
 53. BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW, supra note 46, at 401. 
 54. Rehabilitation and incapacitation are most frequently justified in consequentialist, 
utilitarian terms: it serves the greater good to rehabilitate or incapacitate offenders. But see 
Franklin E. Zimring, Principles of Criminal Sentencing, Plain and Fancy, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 73, 
75 (1987) (suggesting that in some contexts, such as juvenile justice, rehabilitation may be a 
moral obligation rather than simply a utilitarian aim). 
 55. See MPC SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 9, at 35 (“[I]t is difficult to place a ceiling 
upon the goal [of] general incapacitation in the absence of a limiting principle derived from 
retributive theory . . . .”). 
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Incapacitation is simply a way to prevent future crimes—like 
specific deterrence, it is targeted at the individual offender, but unlike 
a deterrence strategy, it tries to make crimes physically impossible 
rather than consequentially unattractive.56 To the extent that 
contemporary criminologists, political leaders, or legal scholars 
advocate punishment for the sake of incapacitation, they do so 
subject to the limitations imposed by other political values, including 
other utilitarian values. The surest form of incapacitation is death, 
and the surest way to incapacitate every convicted offender would be 
to impose capital punishment for all crimes. Almost no one advocates 
such an approach, for incapacitation is hardly society’s only 
consideration.57 Even for strict utilitarians, factors such as the high 
social costs of capital punishment and mass incarceration necessitate 
limits to the pursuit of incapacitation. And of course liberal 
utilitarians—those who would pursue general utilitarian aims only 
insofar as they are consistent with categorical liberal principles—
would also insist on proportionality as an external limitation on the 
power to incapacitate. 
Rehabilitation, to the extent that it is still a viable penal theory,58 
is also limited by broader political concerns that would impose a limit 
on the maximum punishment. Contemporary proponents of 
rehabilitative punishments insist that proportionality principles 
should curtail the extent to which the state can restrict liberty in its 
efforts to rehabilitate.59 Additionally, many who advocate 
 
 56. See, e.g., BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW, supra note 46, at 367 (noting that 
incapacitation through “physical restraint” is but one method of preventing “the recurrence of 
similar offences”). 
 57. In very recent history, the Bush administration asserted an all-but-absolute right to 
incapacitate in certain contexts. The administration argued that it could detain suspected 
terrorists and “enemy combatants” indefinitely in the interests of public safety. See Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519–21 (2004) (rejecting the government’s argument that national 
security interests precluded judicial review of detention of alleged “enemy combatants”). This 
detention is not quite equivalent to penal incapacitation, for many detainees, including Hamdi 
at the time that he brought his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, had not been charged, much 
less convicted, of criminal offenses. Id. at 510–11. Beyond the context of terrorism, many recent 
laws seek to increase the power of the state to incapacitate certain classes of offenders. For a 
survey and critique of these laws, see generally Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: 
Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001). 
 58. See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, in PRINCIPLED 
SENTENCING 23, 22–30 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., Ne. Univ. Press 1992) 
(addressing the scope and causes of the “modern decline of penal rehabilitationism”). 
 59. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 17, 50 
(2003) (arguing that proportionality “serves to limit the punishments prescribed by utilitarian or 
instrumental theories of punishment, such as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation”). 
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rehabilitative punishments emphasize that other penological 
principles—usually, retributive requirements of desert—must first be 
satisfied before the state can exercise its penal power at all.60 
B. Just Deserts, Lex Talionis, and Other Retributive Ideals 
Though utilitarian theorists give the most comprehensive 
accounts of proportionality by far—my description of Bentham’s 
views of proportionality is a very brief summary of a very long 
discussion—it is retributive theorists who are most commonly 
associated with the principle of proportional punishments. Arguments 
for proportionality in retributive theories are more often specifically 
penological arguments than are the utilitarian arguments for 
proportionality. Nevertheless, most retributive accounts of 
punishment are parts of larger political theories, and as such, they 
contain further political arguments for limitations on punishment that 
stand independent of the penal purpose of retribution. 
Retributive theories typically portray punishment as the 
wrongdoer’s “just deserts.” A principle of just deserts can, but need 
not, demand proportionality between offense and sanction; what the 
principle really demands is a correspondence between desert and 
sanction.61 A criminal sentence should be more or less severe in 
accordance with the wrongdoer’s culpability. Notably, the general 
rule of just deserts does not itself prescribe how “desert” is to be 
determined. Desert is an inescapably moral issue, and the 
determination of an offender’s just deserts will depend on a number 
of moral judgments. One may judge desert by assessing the moral 
gravity of the particular offense or may focus upon the individual 
characteristics of the particular offender. Thus, just deserts might be 
compatible with individualized sentencing: one might say that 
defendants who were provoked, or who suffer mental impairments, or 
who repent their crimes and cooperate with authorities thereafter, 
deserve less severe punishments. 
 
 60. See, e.g., David O. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: 
How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1568 (2004) (“The 
retributive formula . . . determines the length or severity of punishment, [but] it does not 
otherwise tell us how to punish. . . . Provided that we punish all and only the guilty and that our 
punishments are proportional to their desert, we should punish in ways designed to rehabilitate 
the offender and deter crime.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1203 
(2000) (“The question is only whether, roughly speaking, the punishment imposed is accurate 
with respect to the person’s desert.”). 
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A second retributive principle that is often associated with 
proportionality is lex talionis, or the law as retaliation.62 In common 
parlance, lex talionis is called the principle of “an eye for an eye.”63 
Although lex talionis can be interpreted to require an element of 
proportionality, it is not first and foremost a principle of 
proportionality.64 As typically invoked, lex talionis is rather a bundle 
of claims about the nature of crime, the proper method of 
punishment, and the effect that punishment should have on the 
offender. Kant, one of the most prominent advocates of lex talionis, 
explains the principle as one of reciprocity and equality. 
But what kind and what degree of punishment does public justice 
take as its principle and norm? None other than the principle of 
equality in the movement of the pointer on the scales of justice . . . . 
Thus any undeserved evil which you do to someone else among the 
people is an evil done to yourself. If you slander him, you slander 
yourself; if you rob him, you rob yourself; if you strike him, you 
strike yourself; and if you kill him, you kill yourself. But it should be 
understood that only the law of retribution (ius talionis) can 
determine exactly what quality and quantity of punishment is 
required, and it must do so in court, not within your private 
judgment.65 
Of course, Kant does not mean that when you rob someone else, you 
literally rob yourself—were that true, state-imposed punishment 
would be unnecessary, for each criminal act would automatically 
entail its own penalty. Rather, Kant means to highlight what is 
objectionable about crime: it fails to adhere to the dictate of the 
categorical imperative that one always act in such a way that the 
maxim guiding one’s action could be universalized into a law for 
everyone.66 Punishment is essentially “an exercise in 
universalization”—it demonstrates to the offender “what it would be 
 
 62. Lex talionis is compatible with nonretributive theories of punishment as well. See infra 
note 68. 
 63. “And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for 
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.” 
Exodus 21:23–25 (King James). 
 64. See Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 47 n.46 (1992) 
(“Proportionality may or may not be a byproduct of the application of lex talionis.”). 
 65. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, reprinted in KANT: POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 131, 155 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991). 
 66. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 (James W. 
Ellington trans., Hackett Publ’g 1981) (1785) (“Act only according to that maxim whereby you 
can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”). 
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like for him if everyone” acted according to the same maxim that 
permitted his crime.67 
A key aspect of lex talionis as presented by Kant is the similarity 
in method between punishment and crime. In other words, “an eye 
for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” is a claim that punishments must 
match crimes not only in magnitude, but also in method—“burning 
for burning.”68 Because the method of punishment shares key features 
with the crime, the punishment requires the punished to live by his 
own maxim, to experience life under the law that he prescribed for 
himself when he committed his offense. To the extent that 
proportionality between crime and punishment is an incidental 
requirement of Kant’s lex talionis, it is a penological proportionality 
requirement and not a political one—proportionality is intrinsically 
linked to the purpose of punishment. But it is not clear whether this 
specifically penological proportionality requirement is still politically 
viable. The insistence that punishments borrow from the methods of 
the corresponding offenses has been subjected to considerable 
ridicule.69 In any event, this strict version of lex talionis is probably not 
 
 67. Waldron, supra note 64, at 29. 
 68. See supra note 63. Note that lex talionis is compatible with utilitarian theories of 
punishment. For example, Bentham suggest that “offenses against honor” might require 
punishments in kind: “For an insult offered to a woman, the man might be muffled up in the 
headdress of a woman, and the like insult might be inflicted on him by the hand of a woman.” 
BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW, supra note 46, at 381. Such methods are designed “to 
transfer to the insolent offender the contempt which he wished to fix upon the innocent.” Id. 
 69. The ridicule is often initiated with the question whether the state should impose rape as 
punishment for rapists. Lex talionis can be interpreted in such a way as to exclude rape for 
rapists, but only at considerable cost to the integrity of the principle. Professor Jeremy Waldron 
has argued that lex talionis requires only that “the act of punishment be the same as the act that 
constituted the offense.” Waldron, supra note 64, at 32. This requirement can be satisfied, 
Waldron argues, as long as the punishment shares the “wrong-making characteristics” of the 
crime. Id. at 37. The wrong-making characteristics of the crime can be defined at a fairly 
abstract level. So, for example, stealing is wrong because it renders property rights insecure and 
produces economic uncertainty. Lex talionis could be satisfied, Waldron suggests, by giving a 
thief “a taste of economic uncertainty in other ways: for example, sentencing him to community 
service on days determined arbitrarily, unpredictably and at the last minute by a probation 
officer.” Id. at 44. This version of lex talionis is certainly consistent with Kant’s account. Kant 
finds lex talionis satisfied if “a high-ranking official convicted of violence” were sentenced to 
make an apology and endure “painful solitary confinement.” KANT, supra note 65, at 156. 
“[A]part from the resultant discomfort, the perpetrator’s vanity would also be painfully 
affected, and this humiliation would provide an appropriate repayment of like with like.” Id. 
Notwithstanding this broad interpretation of lex talionis, it seems to me that the principle is of 
little use given the vast range of criminalized activities and the relative uniformity of criminal 
sanctions. One must generalize “wrong-making” to an almost meaningless abstraction in order 
to find incarceration, fines, and probation sufficient to capture the “wrong-making 
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possible in a penal system that relies almost exclusively on a few 
standard sanctions: fines, community supervision, and imprisonment. 
Does Kant also offer a political argument for proportionality? 
He certainly articulates arguments for limits on punishment that are 
based on broad principles of justice unrelated to penal purpose. 
Wrongdoers must be punished as much as they deserve, but no more 
than they deserve.70 In other words, the fact that an individual has 
violated the categorical imperative and committed a crime does not 
give the sovereign absolute power over that individual. Even just 
punishment is an infliction of pain, and just punishment is just only 
insofar as it corresponds to the moral desert of the punished. 
Anything beyond that is a violation of the individual’s “inherent 
personality” that fails to treat him as an end in himself as required by 
the categorical imperative.71 
Other retributivists have developed similar arguments, 
explaining that desert serves as a “limiting principle”72 or as a “side 
constraint.”73 One could play with the word “just” in “just deserts”—
although the phrase is typically used to mean “the deserts that are in 
 
characteristics” of such diverse crimes as drug possession, financial fraud, physical assault, lying 
to federal agents, production of child pornography, and so on. 
 70. See KANT, supra note 65, at 154–55: 
[W]hat kind and what degree of punishment does public justice take as its principle 
and norm? None other than the principle of equality in the movement of the pointer 
on the scales of justice . . . it should be understood that only the law of retribution (ius 
talionis) can determine exactly what quality and quantity of punishment is 
required . . . . 
 71. Id. at 155 (“For a human being can never be manipulated just as a means of realising 
someone else’s intentions and is not to be confused with the objects of the law of kind. He is 
protected against this by his inherent personality . . . .”); see also Don E. Scheid, Kant’s 
Retributivism, 93 ETHICS 262, 272 (1983) (noting that for Kant, the purposes of punishment 
must “be pursued in a morally acceptable way, that is, in a way which gives full moral respect to 
the persons to whom the penal system is applied”). 
 72. Norval Morris, Desert as a Limiting Principle, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 
58, at 201, 201. For Morris, desert determines both upper limits on punishment, NORVAL 
MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 73 (1974), and, for especially serious offenses, lower 
limits, id. at 74. The American Law Institute has proposed a codification of Morris’s “limiting 
retributivism” into the sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code. See MPC SENTENCING 
REPORT, supra note 9, at 41 (“[B]road support has been voiced for the theory of limiting 
retributivism as the philosophical cornerstone of sentencing decisions under the revised Model 
Penal Code.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 12, at 704 (“Retributivism under the Eighth Amendment . . . 
serves as a side constraint on the socially desirable practice of punishment.”). “Side constraints” 
is Robert Nozick’s term for absolute or near-absolute individual rights that constrain the actions 
of other individuals and of states. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 28–31 
(1974) (noting that to understand rights as side constraints means that one cannot violate those 
rights in pursuit of other goals). 
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accordance with justice,” it might also mean “only what is deserved.” 
Punishment may extend as far as desert, but no farther. Importantly, 
these arguments against punishments that exceed desert are 
arguments about human dignity and individual rights, not arguments 
about penal purpose. It is desert that justifies punishment at all, 
according to these authors, but desert can justify only so much. 
Some contemporary accounts of retributivism focus on notions of 
equality as much as (or more than) they address desert. In one well-
known account of egalitarian retributivism, Herbert Morris posited 
that wrongdoers exempt themselves from the burdens of self-restraint 
imposed by the criminal law.74 Punishment must then be imposed to 
restore the equal distribution of the law’s burdens. Proportionality is 
intrinsic to such egalitarian retributivism: since punishment restores a 
just distribution, the scope of punishment must necessarily 
correspond to the scope of the inequality of burdens and benefits 
created by the offending act.75 Egalitarian retributivism could be said 
to contain both a specifically penological proportionality 
requirement—one intrinsic to the task of restoring equality—and a 
broader political requirement that punishments, qua deprivations, be 
no more severe than necessary to achieve the goal of restored 
equality.76 
 
 74. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, reprinted in SENTENCING, supra note 22, at 
95 (“[I]t is just to punish those who have violated the rules and caused the unfair distribution of 
benefits and burdens. A person who violates the rules has something others have—the benefits 
of the system—but by renouncing what others have assumed, the burdens of self-restraint, he 
has acquired an unfair advantage.”). See also WOJCIECH SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE: 
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND LEGAL THEORY 225–227 (1985) (explaining that punishment is “a 
method of restoring an overall balance of benefits and burdens”). 
 75. Sadurski suggests that we view retributive justice as “the proportional relations 
between inputs and outputs”—the inputs are crimes, the outputs punishments. SADURSKI, supra 
note 74, at 221; see also id. at 229 (“[C]riminal law reflects the hierarchy of protected values: the 
more precious the value, the bigger the benefit of non-self-restraint acquired by the criminal. 
The intuitively just principle that more serious crimes should be punished more heavily is not, 
therefore, violated by the proposition about punishment as a restoration of the balance of 
benefits and burdens.”). 
 76. See Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing, 24 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 288, 296 (1993) (“[T]rue retributivism is, at its core, a deeply egalitarian theory of 
punishment.”). Muller addresses proportionality in passing and, like some other commentators, 
see supra note 22, seems to assume that it is a concept specific to retributive theories. See 
Muller, supra, at 297 (“[T]he idea of proportionality between the seriousness of the offense and 
the amount of punishment is central to retributivism. . .”); see also id. at 340 (“The retributivist 
[in contrast to the utilitarian] would insist that the punishment bear some sense of proportion to 
the . . . nature of the criminal’s wrongdoing.”). Nevertheless, Muller’s arguments against 
excessive sentences, and for mercy in some instances, are explicitly based on the “equal inherent 
worth” of the offender as a human being. See id. at 296. This rationale for a limitation on 
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Thus, to many retributivists, moral desert provides both a floor 
and a ceiling for punishment. To understand why punishment below 
the floor is unacceptable, one must look to the argument for 
punishment: society needs to make criminals experience the 
wrongness of their own acts by inflicting on them harm similar in kind 
and degree. But to understand why punishment above the ceiling is 
unacceptable, one must look beyond the theory of punishment, to 
broader arguments such as the Kantian instruction to respect persons 
as ends in themselves.77 
C. Political Proportionality 
Proportional punishments are required in a wide variety of 
penological perspectives, including the mainstream penological 
theories typically advanced in American legal and political 
discourse.78 But even if a state were to abandon retribution, 
 
sentence severity is not necessarily retributive; presumably, one need not be a retributivist to 
believe that all human beings have equal inherent worth. 
 77. I do not mean to suggest that every retributive theory of punishment can be interpreted 
to include a political argument for proportionality. For example, Hegel certainly demands 
proportionality in punishment, but his argument seems dependent on his particular account of 
the purpose of punishment—and on his unusual claims about the metaphysical effects of crime. 
Hegel argues that crime, or wrong, has a continuing presence (“a positive external existence”) 
even after the moment the wrong is committed. G. W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 123, § 97 (H. B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge University Press 1991) (italics 
in Nisbet’s translation). Punishment serves to negate the crime and restore the world to its pre-
wronged state. See id. § 97, Addition (“The criminal act . . . is itself negative, so that the 
punishment is merely the negation of the negation.”) Hegel’s argument requires proportionality 
but not the strong form of lex talionis—the scope of the punishment must correspond to the 
scope of the injury, but the method of punishment need not correspond to the method of crime. 
Hegel, like other retributive theorists, assumes commensurability between diverse injuries, but 
Hegel is particularly explicit about this commensurability requirement. He assumes that we can 
measure the scope of wrong generated by, say, a physical assault, and choose a corresponding 
punishment that inflicts injury of the same scope. “The cancellation [Aufheben] of crime is 
retribution in so far as the latter, by its concept, is an infringement of an infringement, and in so 
far as crime, by its existence [Dasein], has a determinate qualitative and quantitative magnitude, 
so that its negation, as existent, also has a determinant magnitude. But this identity . . . is not an 
equality in the specific character of the infringement, but in its character in itself—i.e., in terms 
of its value.” Id. at 127, § 101; see generally id. at 121–32, §§ 95–104. 
 78. Restorative justice, a penological paradigm not previously discussed in this Article, 
arguably does not contain a proportionality requirement. Some commentators have suggested 
that restorative justice actively resists at least some versions of proportionality in criminal 
sentencing. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in 
the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 433 (“Almost all the sentencing guidelines reflected 
core principles that are in conflict with the restorative justice movement, namely, 
proportionality . . . .”); John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment is Marginalized: Realistic 
or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999) (noting that the restorative justice model 
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deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation in favor of some other 
penal purpose, basic principles of liberal democracy would still 
impose a proportionality requirement as an upper limit on criminal 
sentences. This political proportionality is a consequence not of 
penological theory itself, but rather of the limits of penological theory. 
No penological theory does (or could) grant a liberal government 
absolute power over an individual who breaks the law.79 Principles 
that may justify punishment are not the only principles that should 
inform choices about penal practices. Alongside retribution, utility 
maximization, and other goals that may lead to the imposition of 
punishment, basic liberal principles of liberty and equality demand 
restrictions on the manner and degree of punishments. A 
proportionality requirement is thus a consequence of competing 
political principles, and such a requirement is essential to any liberal 
account of punishment. In this Section, I explore proportionality as a 
component of political theories of state power. 
Robert Nozick claims that the fundamental question of political 
philosophy is “whether there should be any state at all.”80 The very 
identification of this question as fundamental indicates an already-
existing ideological commitment: a suspicion of power, a default 
assumption that states need to be justified. (Why is the fundamental 
question not “whether there should be any liberty at all”?) But this 
particular ideological commitment is very widely held—most people 
do not start by wondering whether there should be any such thing as 
liberty. Liberals are not alone in thinking that coercive state power 
needs to be justified. Those who spend (waste?) time pondering such 
matters tend to hold the view that state power is at least potentially 
an interference with individual liberty. As such, a coercive state must 
be scrutinized, argued for, and defended rather than accepted 
automatically. 
To the anarchist, the initial suspicion of power cannot be 
eradicated and no state can be justified. To the totalitarian, not only 
power but absolute power is justifiable. Between anarchy and 
totalitarianism lies limited government. The kind of proportionality 
 
“involves rejection of a justice that balances the hurt of the crime with proportionately hurtful 
punishment”). 
 79. See supra note 57. It is important to recognize that even the death penalty does not give 
a liberal state absolute power over the condemned. Liberal justifications for capital punishment 
insist that the condemned retains various rights up to and beyond execution. For example, death 
row inmates may not be tortured or abused, and their corpses must be treated with dignity. 
 80. NOZICK, supra note 73, at 4. 
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requirement that underwrites the American political system and its 
legal institutions, including the law of sentencing, is a consequence of 
two ideological commitments: the view that state power always needs 
to be justified, and the commitment to limited government rather 
than to no state or a total state. 
To elaborate, it is relatively uncontroversial that (1) state power 
must be justified; (2) some (limited) power can be justified; and (3) 
absolute power is never justified. From these claims flows a 
proportionality principle that is broadly political, not specifically 
penological. The state is a set of institutions that exercise a wide 
range of powers. Each particular power must be justified, and the 
justification must apply to each exercise of the power. For example, 
an abstract justification of the power to raise armies does not 
necessarily justify full-time and indefinite compulsory military 
servitude for all adult citizens. Instead, the principle of political 
proportionality holds that the scope of state power should be 
proportional to the occasions for the power. 
The adjective political deserves some specification here, for the 
word is often used by lawyers to mean “majoritarian.” Thus the 
judiciary is often contrasted to the “political branches,” and legal 
questions are distinguished from political ones. This use of the term 
makes “political proportionality” seem ill-suited to serve as the basis 
of judicial review of criminal sentences. I use the term “political” as it 
is used by “political” scientists—and indeed, as it is used by almost 
everyone who is not a lawyer. Political means simply, of a polity. Thus 
I mean to contrast political proportionality—a requirement of a 
political system—with penological proportionality—a requirement of 
a penal theory. 
Political here also serves to emphasize that this kind of 
proportionality is determined by the members of a particular polity; it 
is not dictated by some transcendent authority. To borrow from John 
Rawls, this proportionality requirement is “political and not 
metaphysical.”81 Again, the fact that a proportionality standard is a 
human artifact does not mean that it must be an exclusively 
majoritarian project, or that to involve the judiciary is antidemocratic. 
When Rawls says that justice is political and not metaphysical, he 
 
 81. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 97 (1993). Rawls argues that a political account 
of justice is necessarily distinct from a “comprehensive moral doctrine,” id. at 90–91, and that 
justice must be political rather than metaphysical because citizens in a diverse, pluralistic society 
will never agree on any single transcendent moral authority, id. at 97. 
032006 02_RISTROPH.DOC 4/24/2006  12:27 PM 
2005] PROPORTIONALITY 287 
does not mean that judges have nothing to say about justice. Here is 
further reason to resist the use of the term political to exclude the 
judiciary: it tends to obscure the importance of separation of powers 
and the judiciary’s role in providing checks on the majoritarian 
branches. 
The relation between proportionality and separation of powers 
should be underscored. It is fundamental to theories of limited 
government that government bodies cannot be trusted to impose and 
observe limitations on their own powers. Accordingly, limitations on 
power must come from outside the body that exercises power—from 
the people and from other government institutions. So 
proportionality as a limit on (for example) legislative power cannot 
be left to legislative determination. The phrase “separation of 
powers” is used sloppily today, as a shorthand assertion that the 
judiciary should just leave the legislature alone, or that Congress 
should leave the President to do as he pleases.82 But as the political 
scientist Richard Neustadt observed, our constitutional design creates 
a system of “separated institutions sharing powers.”83 Separation of 
powers does not mean that each branch of government can exercise 
its specific powers without limitation, as though individual liberty 
were likely to be protected by fierce competition among three tyrants. 
To the contrary, separation of powers means that power itself is 
separated, divided and distributed across different political 
institutions and across the branches. The power to punish is one 
governmental power for which such fragmentation is particularly 
important. 
The proportionality relationship identified here is between 
power (such as the power to punish) and the source of the power. In 
this regard, it differs from penological proportionality, which focuses 
on the relationship between the sanction itself and some determinant 
(the offender’s desert, the harm of the crime). In considering whether 
 
 82. This spin on “separation of powers” was invoked to explain Harriet Miers’s withdrawal 
from consideration for the Supreme Court. After members of Congress demanded that the 
White House produce documents related to Miers’s service there, Miers explained that 
“[p]rotection of the prerogatives of the Executive Branch and continued pursuit of my 
nomination are in tension.” In response, President Bush claimed that “Harriet Miers’s decision 
[to withdraw from consideration] demonstrates her deep respect for this essential aspect of the 
constitutional separation of powers. . . .” See Timothy Williams, Bush’s Pick for Court 
Withdraws Her Name; Miers, Under Attack from Both Parties, Calls Process ‘Burden,’ INT. 
HERALD TRIBUNE, October 28, 2005, at 1. 
 83. RICHARD NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 29 
(1960) (emphasis omitted). 
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political proportionality can serve as the basis of a practical 
constitutional standard, it will be important to remember that it is the 
outer scope of the power to punish that courts must determine, not 
the precise severity of a particular offender’s punishment. 
For one example of proportionality as a limitation on 
government power, consider John Locke—by many accounts, the 
venerable godfather of American liberal tradition84—on punishment. 
According to Locke, the power to punish arises as soon as, but no 
sooner than, the law of nature is violated. The power to punish is thus 
always limited in scope by the scope of the transgression. 
[I]n the State of Nature, one Man comes by A Power over another; 
but yet no Absolute or Arbitrary Power, to use a Criminal . . . 
according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his 
own Will, but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and 
conscience dictates, what is proportionate to his Transgression, which 
is so much as may serve for Reparation and Restraint.85 
Note that Locke no sooner announces the power to punish than he 
emphasizes that it is not “absolute or arbitrary.” Note also that Locke 
uses the terms retribute, reparation, and restraint to justify 
punishment, and in fact elsewhere adopts additional justifications, 
including deterrence.86 Locke’s proportionality requirement is not 
dependent upon a single penological purpose, or even on his hybrid 
theory of penal purpose, but upon the natural liberty and equality 
that provide the background against which the right to punish 
sometimes arises. 
In the passage cited above, Locke’s justification for punishment 
and his limitations on punishment are matters of natural right; they 
do not depend upon the existence of a social contract or civil society. 
The social contract ultimately transforms the natural authority to 
 
 84. See, e.g., LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 5–6 (1963) (arguing 
that American democracy “begins with Locke” and “stays with Locke, by virtue of an absolute 
and irrational attachment it develops for him”); see also id. at 8 (describing the American South 
as “an alien child in a liberal family, tortured and confused, driven to a fantasy life which, 
instead of disproving the power of Locke in America, portrays more poignantly than anything 
else the tyranny he has had”). 
 85. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 272, § 8 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (I have added emphasis, and, for the sake of clarity, I have 
removed Locke’s original italics). References to Locke herein include section numbers after the 
page number. 
 86. See, e.g., id. at 274–75, § 12 (“Each Transgression may be punished to that degree, and 
with so much Severity as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the Offender, give him cause to 
repent, and terrifie others from doing the like.”). 
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punish into the state’s political authority to punish, and it transforms 
the natural limitations on punishment into political limitations that 
restrict the state’s power to punish. In other words, Locke’s 
proportionality begins as a matter of natural law. Of course, 
liberalism as practiced in contemporary America is not necessarily 
based on a shared theory of natural law. Rawls’s “political liberalism” 
is at least as good an explanation of why American society adopts the 
views of individual rights and legitimate government that it does.87 
But for the purposes of my argument, it does not matter whether 
American society is more Lockean or more Rawlsian. The key point 
is that once one has accepted basic principles of individual freedom 
and equality—for whatever philosophical or pragmatic reason—those 
principles create a presumption against the exercise of force that any 
justification for punishment must overcome. The principle of 
proportionality is a requirement that the power to punish reaches 
only as far as the injury to be addressed.88 
The political nature of the proportionality requirement may be 
largely overlooked in legal scholarship because punishment tends to 
be theorized as an independent practice, divorced from important 
background assumptions about liberty, utility, and individual rights.89 
It is important to resist this tendency, for any theory of punishment 
needs to be placed in the context of a larger political theory. 
Punishment is the quintessential example of state coercion. 
Punishment theory must not limit itself to the particular moral or 
economic interests that might be served by such coercion; it needs to 
 
 87. See generally RAWLS, supra note 81. 
 88. Cf. Francis A. Allen, A Matter of Proportion, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 343, 344 (2001) (noting 
that the principle of proportionality in punishment used to be “understood in much the same 
way as other limitations on governmental powers set forth in the bills of rights of American 
federal and state constitutions”). 
 89. For example, Professor Jeffrie Murphy has explained that two very different accounts 
of punishment emerge from Kant’s work depending upon whether one focuses strictly on the 
famous passages on punishment in Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals or instead collects 
Kant’s observations about punishment across all of his writings. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does 
Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 518 (1987) (“Is the above account 
in fact what we find consistently defended and amplified in the text of the Rechtslehre? 
Hardly!”). When one considers all of Kant’s writings other than Part I of The Metaphysics of 
Morals, it is clear that for Kant, “justified punishment is a deterrence system functioning to 
maintain a system of ordered liberty of action. To set any more morally ambitious goal for 
punishment would be to adopt an unacceptable theory of the role of the state and would 
represent an attempt to play God . . . .” Id. at 517. 
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draw upon political theory more generally to explain how other 
political principles circumscribe the use of coercion.90 
I do not mean to suggest that all theorists of punishment have 
overlooked this point. In The Aims of the Criminal Law, Henry M. 
Hart emphasizes the larger political context in which punishment 
takes place. “A penal code that reflected only a single basic principle 
would be a very bad one. Social purposes can never be single or 
simple, or held unqualifiedly . . . and an effort to make them so can 
result only in the sacrifice of other values which also are important.”91 
Hart argues that background conditions unrelated to penal 
purposes—such as individual rights—impose constraints on the way a 
state determines guilt and imposes punishments. 
Or, in the words of the other Hart: 
[I]n relation to any social institution, after stating what general aim 
or value its maintenance fosters we should enquire whether there 
are any and if so what principles limiting the unqualified pursuit of 
that aim or value. Just because the pursuit of any single social aim 
always has its restrictive qualifier, our main social institutions always 
possess a plurality of features which can only be understood as a 
compromise between partly discrepant principles.92 
In the same essay, H.L.A. Hart famously insisted that the “General 
Justifying Aim” of punishment was a separate question from 
questions about the appropriate distribution of punishment (who to 
punish, and how much).93 A proportionality principle guides the 
distribution of punishment, and as Hart recognized, such a principle 
might be dictated by a retributive account of the general justifying 
 
 90. In Professor Murphy’s terms, it is important to distinguish between moral and political 
justifications for punishment. Even if one is certain that punishment is morally just, one still 
needs an argument for why “the pursuit of these [moral] goals is part of the legitimate business of 
the state.” Id. at 510; see also Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 321, 371 (2002) (“[T]here is reason to hope that debate about utility and 
autonomy in criminal lawmaking will become more productive once it is redefined as a political 
debate about institutions rather than a moral debate about the conduct of criminals and 
officials.”); Don E. Scheid, Kant’s Retributivism, 93 ETHICS 262, 265–271 (1983) (assessing 
whether Kant’s legal justification for punishment is consistent with his moral theories). 
 91. Hart, supra note 13, at 401. 
 92. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 10 (1968). 
 93. See id. at 4, 8–13. 
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aim of punishment, but it might also be dictated by considerations 
entirely external to the general justifying aim.94 
In short, punishment does not take place in a vacuum and it 
should not be theorized in a vacuum. Consideration of the larger 
political context reveals the limits of penal theory—one sees that 
there are some exercises of force that no penal theory can justify. 
Political proportionality is a claim about the limits of penal theory in 
a liberal state. It is not a theory of punishment, but a theory of the 
relationship between state power and individual right. As  
described in Part III, individual criminal defendants should be able to 
invoke proportionality as a constitutional limitation on their 
sentences. 
Before elaborating the details of this constitutional right of 
criminal defendants, it is worth examining the extent to which 
constitutional doctrine has already embraced proportionality as a 
principle of limited government. In a number of doctrinal areas 
beyond criminal sentences, the Supreme Court has used the concept 
of proportionality to limit state power when that power arises and is 
exercised in response to specified conduct. In contrast, the Court  
has been more reluctant to embrace proportionality in the context  
of criminal sentences. But even the criminal sentencing decisions  
that first developed the notion of proportionality are better 
understood as evaluations of the scope of the power to punish in  
light of individual rights—as decisions about political 
proportionality—than as vindications or rejections of particular 
penological theories. 
 
 94. “[I]t is perfectly consistent to assert both that the General Justifying Aim of the 
practice of punishment is its beneficial consequences and that the pursuit of this General Aim 
should be qualified or restricted out of deference to principles of Distribution which require that 
punishment should be only of an offender for an offense. Conversely it does not in the least 
follow from the admission of the latter principle of retribution in Distribution that the General 
Justifying Aim of punishment is Retribution though of course Retribution in General Aim 
entails retribution in Distribution.” Id. at 9. I would not follow Hart in calling a requirement 
that punishment be imposed only on the guilty a principle of “retribution in distribution.” A 
guilt requirement is justifiable on utilitarian grounds as well as not-necessarily-retributive liberal 
grounds (such as the principle of notice). 
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II.  PROPORTIONALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
A. Beyond Punishment 
For the most part, the United States Constitution itself does not 
speak explicitly of “proportionality.”95 But it establishes government 
powers and limits those powers. As courts interpret and apply the 
Constitution, they often rely on the concept of proportionality to 
assess the scope of government powers. To be sure, proportionality as 
a constitutional principle is not as frequently invoked in the United 
States as it is in some other constitutional democracies. For instance, 
courts in Germany and Canada use well-established proportionality 
tests as tools to limit state power.96 But even if American courts 
invoke proportionality less often than do foreign courts, the 
concept—and sometimes the language—of proportionality appears 
from time to time in American constitutional decisions. In several 
constitutional contexts unrelated to criminal punishment, the extent 
of a state power is determined in part by the scope of the problem or 
conduct that gave rise to the specific power. A brief survey of these 
doctrinal areas demonstrates that a general proportionality 
requirement underlies the very concept of limited government and 
the application of that concept in American constitutional law.97 
 
 95. The U.S. Constitution twice uses the term proportion: Article I, section 9, clause 4 
provides that “No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the 
Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. Section 2 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment specifies the apportionment of representatives to states, and 
provides that when male citizens lose their right to vote for reasons other than “participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-
one years of age in such state.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 96. For a description of the proportionality principle under the German constitution, see 
David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 689 n.135 (2005) (“Germany 
is credited with the invention of proportionality review . . . .”). Under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, intrusions on individual rights may be upheld if the intrusions are 
“demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, §§ 1–4, sched. B (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 44, 
(Appendix 1985). Canadian courts apply the “Oakes test” to evaluate intrusions on individual 
rights; that test includes an inquiry into whether the means chosen by the government are 
proportional to its purpose. Regina v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103, 114. For a comparative 
constitutional law analysis of proportionality, see Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and 
Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on “Proportionality,” Rights and 
Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 602–24 (1999). 
 97. For an overview of “proportionality” tests in several areas of constitutional law, see 
K.G. Jan Pillai, Incongruent Disproportionality, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645, 655–93 (2002). 
Professor Pillai examines proportionality standards in the contexts of the Fifth Amendment’s 
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Proportionality principles—sometimes explicit, sometimes 
implicit—underlie the familiar evaluative mechanisms with which 
courts adjudicate claims that a state actor has exceeded its power. 
When a court requires that a coercive or intrusive state action be 
“narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling state interest,” it enforces 
the principle that state power must be proportional to the interest 
that allegedly justifies the power. Richard Frase has recently noted 
that “narrow tailoring” is a form of proportionality requirement.98 
But the notion that state power is limited by proportionality 
considerations extends beyond the rare circumstances in which courts 
will require “narrow tailoring.” In fact, proportionality is explicitly 
invoked in other contexts. For example, to decide whether 
“exactions” are permissible under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause, the Supreme Court applies a “rough proportionality” 
analysis.99 Exactions are required dedications of private property for 
public use as a condition of permission to develop the property. The 
government’s power to exact property from a private landowner must 
be proportional in scope to the effects of the proposed development. 
“No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must 
make some sort of individualized determination that the required 
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the 
proposed development.”100 Here, a government power (the power to 
condition permission to develop on the dedication of private property 
to public use) arises when private conduct results in or is likely to 
 
Takings Clause, the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments and Excessive Fines 
Clauses, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in an attempt to clarify the 
meaning of the “congruence and proportionality” standard announced in City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
 98. See Frase, supra note 12, at 618. Frase argues that proportionality underlies an even 
broader array of constitutional rules, including not only the Eighth Amendment and the Due 
Process Clause but also Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules, Fourth Amendment 
“reasonableness,” public forum rules under the First Amendment, and balancing under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. See id. at 598–621. 
 99. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702–03 (1999); 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
 100. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. The Dolan Court characterized its decision as a protection of 
individual rights against government power: 
[S]imply denominating a governmental measure as a “business regulation” does not 
immunize it from constitutional challenge on the ground that it violates a provision of 
the Bill of Rights . . . . We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth 
Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in these . . . 
circumstances. 
Id. at 392. 
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result in unwanted social consequences (as when a proposed 
development creates an impact on the surrounding area). The scope 
of the newly arisen power is limited by the scope of the condition that 
gave rise to the power.101 
A particularly controversial proportionality requirement has 
been used to determine the scope of Congress’s powers under Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. In City of Boerne v. Flores,102 the 
Court found the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to be an 
unconstitutional legislative attempt to alter the substantive rights 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.103 Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress power “to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” According to 
the Court, this enforcement power is remedial and preventive; 
legislation adopted under Section Five “must be judged with 
reference to the historical experience . . . it reflects.”104 That is, Section 
Five enforcement powers arise in conjunction with particular social or 
political problems (e.g., discriminatory conditions), and the scope of 
those powers is determined by the scope of the relevant problems. 
“There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury 
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”105 
 
 101. The Del Monte Dunes Court noted that, although “rough proportionality” is a test 
specific to the exactions context, “in a general sense concerns for proportionality animate the 
Takings Clause.” 526 U.S. at 702. For the purposes of this Article, the more specific 
proportionality test used to evaluate exactions is the better illustration of political 
proportionality. The exactions test creates a link between private conduct (the conduct of the 
property owner) and government power. In the criminal context, there should be a similar link 
between the criminal conduct and the power to punish. 
 102. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 103. Id. at 536. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4 (1993), was Congress’s response to Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990), in which the Court held that facially neutral laws that happened to inhibit religious 
practices were not subject to heightened scrutiny. Id. at 878–79. The RFRA attempted to 
“overrule” Smith; it provided that in order to enforce facially neutral laws that substantially 
burdened religious exercise, a state or local government had to demonstrate that the law was the 
least restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4. 
 104. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 
308 (1966)). 
 105. Id. at 520. Similarly, 
[w]hile preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must be 
a congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved. The 
appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil 
presented. Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted 
response to another, lesser one. 
Id. at 530 (citation omitted). 
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The congruence and proportionality standard of City of Boerne is 
a useful illustration of the Court’s familiarity with proportionality as a 
means of restricting government power in accordance with specific 
injuries or problems that give rise to the power. Take, for example, 
the different results in two recent cases involving the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). In Board of Trustees v. Garrett,106 the 
Court found that Congress had exceeded its Section Five powers by 
permitting suits against states for employment discrimination under 
Title I of the ADA.107 Congress had in fact amassed substantial 
evidence of discrimination against disabled persons by states, but 
most of the evidence related to “the provision of public services and 
public accommodations,” not to employment discrimination.108 The 
Court found that the remedy created by Congress (abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity) was not proportional to the specific problem to 
be addressed (discrimination against the disabled by state 
employers).109 
In contrast, congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity 
in Title II of the ADA was upheld in Tennessee v. Lane.110 Title II 
aims at exactly the kind of discrimination that the Garrett Court 
found Congress to have demonstrated most completely: 
discrimination against the disabled in the provision of public services 
and public accommodations.111 Thus the Lane Court found the same 
remedy that had been at issue in Garrett (abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity) to be “congruent and proportional” when 
applied to a problem that the Court viewed as more substantial 
(failure to provide equal access to public services and 
accommodations).112 Together, Garrett and Lane illustrate that the 
 
 106. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 107. Id. at 374. 
 108. Id. at 371 n.7. 
 109. Id. at 374. 
 110. 541 U.S. 509 (2004). George Lane, a wheelchair-bound paraplegic and one of the two 
plaintiffs, had been called to answer criminal charges in a courtroom on the second floor of a 
Tennessee courthouse that had no elevator. On one occasion, Lane crawled up two flights of 
stairs to get to the courtroom, but on a second trip to the courthouse for a hearing, Lane refused 
to be carried up the stairs or to crawl again. He was arrested and jailed for failure to appear, and 
subsequently filed suit against the state under the ADA for failure to provide access to the 
courts. Id. at 513–14. 
 111. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,131–12,165. 
 112. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531. Although the Court found Title II of the ADA to pass muster 
under the congruence and proportionality test, other doctrinal considerations may also have 
contributed to the different outcomes in Garrett and Lane. The Lane Court noted that Title II 
was not only a prohibition of “irrational disability discrimination” but also an effort “to enforce 
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Court is familiar with, and willing to employ, a broad proportionality 
principle that determines the scope of legislative power with 
reference to the specific problem that gives rise to the power.113 
In drawing a comparison between a political proportionality 
requirement for criminal sentences and the “congruence and 
proportionality” test of City of Boerne, I do not mean to endorse that 
particular doctrinal development in the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence. The test was initially used to strike down several 
antidiscrimination laws one after the other114 and has been the target 
of considerable scholarly critique.115 In many ways, a proportionality 
requirement may be both easier to implement and more useful in the 
context of criminal sentences than in the context of federal 
antidiscrimination efforts. Here, the reference to City of Boerne and 
its progeny is merely a demonstration that nonpenological 
proportionality is already well-established in constitutional doctrine. 
 
a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more 
searching judicial review.” Id. at 522–23. 
 113. Justice Scalia joined the City of Boerne majority in its original statement of the 
congruence and proportionality test, and he subsequently voted with the majority in every case 
in which the City of Boerne standard was used to strike down antidiscrimination legislation. See 
Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372–74 (2001) (applying City of Boerne and finding 
that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act was not a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 
Five enforcement powers); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619–20 (2000) (applying 
City of Boerne and finding that the Violence Against Women Act was not a valid exercise of 
Congress’s Section Five enforcement powers); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82–
83 (2000) (applying City of Boerne to strike down the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
as applied against state and local governments). When the Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000), was sustained under the congruence and proportionality 
test, Justice Scalia dissented. Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 741 (2003) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia dissented again in Tennessee v. Lane, and went so far as to 
reject the congruence and proportionality test outright: “I yield to the lessons of experience. 
The ‘congruence and proportionality’ standard, like all such flabby tests, is a standing invitation 
to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking.” 541 U.S. at 557–58 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 114. See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding 
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act unconstitutional insofar as it subjected states to 
private suits in federal court); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking 
down the Violence Against Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000) 
(striking down the Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s abrogation of state sovereign 
immunity). But the last two statutes scrutinized under the test were found to be congruent and 
proportional responses to discrimination and thus legitimate exercises of Congressional power. 
See Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (upholding Title II of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act); Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003) (upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993). 
 115. For an overview of the effects of City of Boerne and its progeny on equal protection 
jurisprudence, see generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection By Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000). 
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It might be argued that it is the uniquely remedial nature of 
Section Five enforcement powers that makes proportionality an 
appropriate measure of those powers, and that proportionality should 
not be similarly used to constrict the legislative power to prescribe 
criminal sanctions. The City of Boerne Court emphasized that 
Congress has no power to define substantive rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but courts have traditionally recognized an 
almost completely unfettered legislative power to define the 
substantive criminal law. To make this argument, however, is to 
assume one’s conclusion, for what is at stake in the debate over 
proportionality is, in part, the scope of the power to define 
substantive criminal law. Legal academics sometimes speak of 
“substantive criminal law” as including only those laws defining 
activity as criminal, “criminal procedure” as those laws governing the 
apprehension of suspects and determination of guilt, and “the law of 
criminal sentencing” as a third category.116 But a penalty is a necessary 
(though perhaps not sufficient) condition of any criminal law, and 
thus sentences are as much the “substance” of criminal law as the 
categories of prohibited behavior.117 As elaborated in Part III, 
proportionality principles have implications for both substantive 
criminal law and constitutional criminal procedure. 
In any event, the Court has enthusiastically embraced 
proportionality as a limitation on exercises of state power in one 
context much more akin to criminal sentences than Fourteenth 
Amendment remedies: punitive damages in civil tort suits. 
B. Proportionality and the Pocketbook 
There does not seem to be much doubt that when money is at 
stake, proportionality matters. For several years, the Supreme Court 
 
 116. See, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, The Craft of Due Process, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 477, 480 
(2001) (noting “the contrast between the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the area of criminal 
procedure and roughly contemporaneous developments in other areas of law critical to the 
resolution of criminal cases: substantive criminal law, the law of sentencing and the law of 
evidence”). 
 117. The intersection of sentencing and the substantive criminal law is particularly evident 
in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), in which the Court found a jail sentence of ninety 
days to be “cruel and unusual punishment” for the offense of “be[ing] addicted to the use of 
narcotics.” Id. at 662, 667. Robinson is considered one of the Supreme Court’s very few 
“substantive criminal law” decisions, but importantly, it was the imposition of the sentence that 
gave the Court a constitutional basis to strike down the law. See also William J. Stuntz, The 
Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 66–67 
(1997) (discussing sentencing as part of the substantive criminal law). 
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has reviewed and sometimes invalidated jury awards of punitive 
damages in civil tort suits to ensure that the punitive element of the 
awards is proportional to the offensive conduct being punished.118 For 
much longer, the Court has reiterated the principle that punitive or 
exemplary damages should correspond to “the enormity of [the] 
offense.”119 And in the criminal context, the Court has found the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to include a 
proportionality requirement for monetary sanctions.120 
The Court has not suggested that the need for proportionality 
review in the context of civil punitive damages is conditioned on a 
particular penological theory. To the contrary, the Court has 
explicitly recognized proportionality in this context as essential to 
protect individual rights—namely, the property interest identified in 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Punitive 
damage awards are unconstitutional if they are so “excessive as to 
amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.”121 
To protect this property interest, the Court considers three factors 
first identified in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore122: “the degree 
of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct,” “the disparity 
between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the 
punitive damages award,” and “the difference between the punitive 
damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or 
imposed in comparable cases.”123 
The Court recently applied the Gore test to reverse a $145 
million punitive damage award in State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell,124 and there the distinction between penological purposes 
and arguments for proportionality is even more explicit. The Court 
noted, almost as an aside, that punitive damages “are aimed at 
 
 118. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (reversing a 
judgment for $145 million in punitive damages on the grounds that the award “was neither 
reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed”); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996) (reversing a judgment for $2 million in punitive damages as “grossly 
excessive”); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453, 482 (1993) (affirming a 
$10 million punitive damage award against a challenge that the award was “grossly excessive”). 
 119. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851); see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 575–
76 (citing cases). 
 120. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). 
 121. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909). 
 122. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 123. State Farm, 538 U.S. 408 at 418 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575). 
 124. Id. at 408. 
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deterrence and retribution”125 and may be imposed “to further a 
State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and 
deterring its repetition.”126 Immediately thereafter, the Court shifted 
gears and announced that “it is well established that there are 
procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on these 
awards.”127 As State Farm presented the argument, the limitations are 
based in the Due Process Clause and are independent of theories of 
deterrence or retribution. Indeed, when an award is excessive, its 
alleged punitive purpose will be deemed irrelevant: “To the extent an 
award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate purpose and 
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property.”128 
Money has also generated searching proportionality review in 
the criminal context. In United States v. Bajakajian,129 the Court 
applied the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment for the 
first time.130 “The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the 
Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The 
amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of 
the offense that it is designed to punish.”131 As with the civil 
proportionality requirement of Gore and State Farm, there is no 
suggestion that proportionality in the context of criminal fines is 
linked to a particular theory of punishment. Rather, the Excessive 
Fines Clause announces an individual right, traced in Justice 
Thomas’s majority opinion all the way back to the Magna Carta and 
traditional concerns about abuses of government power.132 To defend 
that right, the Bajakajian Court announced a standard of de novo 
review for appellate courts considering excessiveness challenges.133 
The Court did not offer a general framework for reviewing fines for 
excessiveness, but it considered roughly the same kinds of factors 
 
 125. Id. at 416. 
 126. Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 568). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 417. 
 129. 524 U.S. 321 (1998). 
 130. See id. at 327 (“This Court has had little occasion to interpret, and has never actually 
applied, the Excessive Fines Clause.”). The Eighth Amendment provides that “Excessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 131. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334. 
 132. Id. at 335. 
 133. Id. at 336 n.10. Just before announcing the standard of de novo review, the majority 
opinion reiterated the importance of judicial deference in the context of proportionality review. 
Id. at 336. 
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identified in Gore for proportionality review of civil damages and in 
Solem v. Helm134 for proportionality review of criminal sentences. 
Specifically, the Bajakajian Court considered the gravity of the 
offense (determined in part with reference to civil sanctions for 
similar conduct), the harm caused by the offense, and the severity of 
the punishment.135 
The punitive damages and Excessive Fines cases, along with the 
Takings Clause exactions cases, indicate strong support for what 
might be called property-interest proportionality. In some 
circumstances, a harm, injury, or offense will give the state power to 
encroach upon private property rights, but the resultant power must 
be proportional to the triggering harm, injury, or offense. 
Proportionality is required even when the property seizure is punitive 
and regardless of the state’s particular punitive purpose. As a few 
commentators have now noted, the proportionality review applied to 
monetary penalties has not been matched when freedom rather than 
money is at stake.136 
C. Death, Prison, and Gross Disproportionality 
These examples show that proportionality is well-established in 
American constitutional doctrine as a device by which to limit 
government power when it encroaches on individual property rights, 
and as a device to limit congressional power when it encroaches on 
the powers of the states. With respect to nonmonetary criminal 
sanctions, the role of proportionality is less clear. Most criminal 
defendants who have challenged their sentences as disproportionate 
have hung their arguments on the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
 
 134. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). For a more detailed discussion of Solem v. Helm, see infra text 
accompanying notes 186–192. 
 135. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337–40. Since Bajakajian, the Court has not considered another 
challenge to a criminal fine under the Excessive Fines Clause. 
 136. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 1062 (“[T]he Court’s decisions provide that 
taking away too much money is unconstitutional, but too many years in prison is not.”); Karlan, 
supra note 12, at 882 (“So it’s interesting that, having sharply cut back on proportionality review 
of criminal sentences, the Court has identified a proportionality principle for criminal 
fines . . . .”); Van Cleave, supra note 12, at 200 (“Yet, ironically, the Court has not shown the 
same concern about excessiveness and disproportionality [as it has in the monetary realm] when 
the punishment is imprisonment, a deprivation of liberty.”); Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The 
Supreme Court’s Backwards Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of 
Excessive Criminal Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 
1252 (2000) (“It thus appears that the Supreme Court has not only analyzed excessive criminal 
punishment claims separately from excessive punitive damages verdicts, but it has also 
promulgated different levels of proportionality review for the two areas.”). 
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of “cruel and unusual punishments.” This strategy is understandable 
enough, but in recent years it has had two unfortunate consequences. 
First, proportionality analysis in the criminal context often devolves 
into inevitably inconclusive historical arguments over the extent to 
which a concern about excessiveness was implicit in the original 
meaning of the phrase “cruel and unusual punishments.”137 Second, 
those who reject historical or originalist approaches have turned to 
penological purpose as an anchor to give meaning to the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause.138 These arguments have led the Court 
to overlook proportionality as an implication of basic rights to liberty 
and life enshrined in the Constitution and in liberal democratic 
principles more generally. 
The muddle is only about twenty-five years old. From 1910 until 
1980, the Court seemed to recognize that the Eighth Amendment 
contained not one but two proportionality principles: a liberty-
interest proportionality requirement that incursions on liberty (or 
life) be proportionate to the offense for which they were imposed, 
and an equality-interest proportionality requirement that 
punishments be imposed consistently and nonarbitrarily.139 These 
proportionality principles were considered to be separate from but 
consistent with the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of certain modes 
of punishment, such as torture. 
The Court’s first clear statement of a proportionality 
requirement in the Eighth Amendment came in Weems v. United 
States.140 There, the Court overturned a sentence of fifteen years of 
 
 137. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 312 & n.5 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that “historians and 
scholars have disagreed about the Framers’ original intentions” with respect to the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, and citing sources). 
 138. See infra notes 172–222 and accompanying text. 
 139. As Professor Joseph Raz has pointed out, equality is often mistakenly identified as an 
independent principle when it is actually the consequence of the general applicability of other 
principles. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 220 (1986) (“Every moral and every 
political theory which claims either that it is a complete theory, or even merely that it is 
complete regarding some issue, contains a principle of equality in this sense.”). If what I have 
called liberty-interest proportionality were universally realized, then the need for equality-
interest proportionality would disappear. Even though the principle of liberty-interest 
proportionality contains within it equality-interest proportionality, I find it useful to speak of 
both forms of proportionality. The distinction helps explain the different ways the Supreme 
Court speaks of proportionality. Moreover, in practice liberty-interest proportionality is hard to 
achieve, and courts may use equality-interest proportionality as a proxy for liberty-interest 
proportionality. If one is unsure of the demands of liberty-interest proportionality in a particular 
case, one can consider what other jurisdictions do in similar cases. 
 140. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
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“cadena” (a combination penalty that involved imprisonment, hard 
labor, and permanent loss of civil rights) for making a false entry in 
an official document.141 “[I]t is a precept of justice that punishment for 
crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.”142 The 
Weems opinion says almost nothing about penal purposes—except to 
recognize the possibility that without constitutional limitations, a 
state might use cruelty in its “zeal for a purpose, either honest or 
sinister.”143 Because even criminal laws with “honest purposes” can be 
cruel, the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is “essential 
to . . . the maintenance of individual freedom.”144 
To support its conclusion that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments” was both an 
antitorture provision and a proportionality requirement, the Weems 
Court considered the context in which the Bill of Rights was adopted. 
Patrick Henry and other supporters of the Eighth Amendment were 
motivated by more than a fear of torture; they also sought to protect 
individuals against much more mundane abuses of government 
power, including the power to punish. 
Henry and those who believed as he did would take no chances. 
Their predominant political impulse was distrust of power, and they 
insisted on constitutional limitations against its abuse. But surely 
they intended more than to register a fear of the forms of abuse that 
went out of practice with the Stuarts. Surely, their jealousy of power 
had a saner justification than that. They were men of action, 
practical and sagacious, not beset with vain imagining, and it must 
have come to them that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws 
other than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation.145 
On this reading of history, the Eighth Amendment is consistent with 
other constitutional provisions that seek to limit government power 
 
 141. Id. at 357, 366–67. 
 142. Id. at 367. 
 143. Id. at 373. 
 144. Id. (quoting Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 122 (1904)). The Weems Court 
observed that the Philippine bill of rights’ prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment was 
“intended to carry to the Philippine Islands those principles of our government which the 
President declared to be established as rules of law for the maintenance of individual freedom.” 
Id. at 368 (quoting Kepner, 195 U.S. at 124). 
 145. Id. at 372. The Weems Court went on to note that a proportionality requirement for 
penalties is essential when the legislature has near-absolute power to define what activity is 
criminal. Id. For a discussion of the interrelationship between defining crime and fixing 
sentences, see infra Part III. 
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even in its ordinary modes of operation.146 But since Weems, the Court 
has not again acknowledged as explicitly that the principles of limited 
government and the liberty interests of individuals necessitate a 
proportionality requirement for criminal sentences.147 
Individual liberty was nonetheless the basis of the Court’s 
decision in Robinson v. California,148 which held that legislatures may 
not impose any criminal sentence for “status offenses.”149 Now 
characterized as a protection of “ordered liberty” through substantive 
due process,150 Robinson invalidated a ninety-day jail sentence 
imposed for the offense of drug addiction.151 The Court noted that a 
ninety-day sentence, “in the abstract,” is clearly not a categorically 
prohibited form of punishment, but the Eighth Amendment is not 
simply a restriction on modes of punishment.152 Even a short jail 
sentence can be cruel and unusual if imposed for a physiological 
condition rather than an action.153 Robinson makes clear that the 
Eighth Amendment limits not only the methods used to punish, but 
also the severity of punishment. When the state seeks to imprison an 
individual, reviewing courts must ask what the imprisonment is for—
what conduct might have triggered the power to punish.154 
 
 146. Justice (Edward) White dissented in Weems; he argued that the text and history of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause showed that it prohibited only “illegal” (not 
legislatively authorized) punishments or certain “inhuman” bodily punishments. 217 U.S. at 
389–96 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia has advanced a similar historical argument. See, 
e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966–85 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.). Debates about 
the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment are far from settled, however. As noted, the 
Weems majority also relied on historical analysis. One leading article on the original meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment argues that proportionality was a component of the British ban on 
“cruel and unusual punishments,” and if the American Framers left proportionality out of the 
Eighth Amendment, they almost surely did so unintentionally. Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted”: The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 860–65 
(1969). 
 147. The Court reiterated the Weems holding in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286–92 (1983), 
but was less explicit in Solem about the individual liberty interest that underlies the Eighth 
Amendment proportionality requirement. 
 148. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 149. Id. at 666–67. 
 150. See, e.g., Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 292 n.313 
(1982) (treating Robinson as part of the “ordered liberties” doctrine). 
 151. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 661, 667. 
 152. Id. at 667. 
 153. Id. at 666–67. 
 154. Later Supreme Court decisions characterize Robinson as a key proportionality 
decision. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting Robinson, 370 U.S. at 
666–67). 
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A proportionality requirement that fixes a ceiling on penalties 
for a specific offense protects the liberty interest of the individual 
defendant. In addition, each individual has an interest in being 
treated equally by the criminal law. Equality-interest proportionality 
motivated several of the many opinions filed in Furman v. Georgia,155 
the 1972 decision invalidating the death penalty as then applied.156 
Justice Douglas found the prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment to forbid “selective and irregular” penalties as well as 
“barbaric” ones.157 “[I]t is ‘cruel and unusual’ to apply the death 
penalty—or any other penalty—selectively to minorities whose 
numbers are few . . . and who are unpopular, but whom society is 
willing to see suffer though it would not countenance general 
application of the same penalty across the board.”158 Similarly, Justice 
Brennan noted that “the very words ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ 
imply condemnation of the arbitrary infliction of severe 
punishments.”159 Justice Stewart agreed: “These death sentences are 
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is 
cruel and unusual.”160 
In Furman, there was majority support for a principle of 
equality-interest proportionality and for the conclusion that the death 
penalty as then applied was unconstitutional under that principle. But 
no majority agreed that the death penalty was per se disproportionate 
to any offense (or per se cruel and unusual for other reasons). 
Consequently, states passed new capital punishment statutes that 
purported to ensure that the penalty would not be arbitrarily applied. 
Just four years after Furman, Georgia’s revised statute passed muster 
before the Court.161 One of the features of the Georgia statute singled 
out for the Court’s approval was its guarantee of appellate review to 
ensure that each death sentence was “proportional to other sentences 
 
 155. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
 156. Id. at 240–41. Furman was decided 5–4, and each of the nine Justices filed a separate 
opinion. 
 157. Id. at 242, 245 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 158. Id. at 245. 
 159. Id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan found three principles inherent in 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause: First, “a punishment must not be so severe as to be 
degrading to the dignity of human beings.” Id. at 271. Second, “the State must not arbitrarily 
inflict a severe punishment.” Id. at 274. Third, “a severe punishment must not be unacceptable 
to contemporary society.” Id. at 277. 
 160. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 161. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976). 
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imposed for similar crimes.”162 Additionally, Gregg v. Georgia 
reiterated the general proportionality requirement first announced in 
Weems: a “punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the 
severity of the crime.”163 
One year later, proportionality in Georgia’s capital punishment 
scheme came before the Court a third time in Coker v. Georgia.164 The 
Court granted a writ of certiorari to consider the claim that the death 
penalty was an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment for 
the crime of rape. Although the Coker Court engaged in a kind of 
equality-interest analysis by looking across the states (and even to 
international law165) to see how many other jurisdictions imposed 
capital punishment for rape, its decision ultimately rested on the 
interest of the individual defendant in life and liberty.166 “We have the 
abiding conviction that the death penalty, which ‘is unique in its 
severity and irrevocability,’ is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, 
as such, does not take human life.”167 
The Coker opinion is not as clear as it could be, and it has 
prompted considerable confusion about the need to consider 
purposes of punishment when interpreting the Eighth Amendment. 
In fact, a misreading of Coker’s holding may be one of the most 
important factors contributing to the Court’s retreat from 
proportionality review in recent years. Coker interpreted Gregg to 
hold that a punishment was unconstitutionally excessive “if it (1) 
makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment 
 
 162. Id. at 203. The Court later held—or, at least, strongly suggested—that this sort of 
proportionality review of death sentences was not, in fact, a constitutional requirement. Pulley 
v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1984). For two perspectives on the scope of the Pulley v. Harris 
holding, compare Barry Latzer, The Failure of Comparative Proportionality Review of Capital 
Cases (with Lessons From New Jersey), 64 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1170 (2001) (arguing that Pulley 
definitely ended the Constitutional requirement of comparative review), with Evan J. Mandery, 
In Defense of Specific Proportionality Review, 65 ALB. L. REV. 883, 899 (2002) (arguing that it is 
unclear what sort of proportionality review the Court considered and whether it rejected 
anything more than a mere procedural requirement). 
 163. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958); Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). 
 164. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 165. “[O]ut of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death 
penalty for rape where death did not ensue.” Id. at 596 n.10. 
 166. See id. at 593–97 (“These recent events evidencing the attitude of state legislatures and 
sentencing juries do not wholly determine this controversy . . . .”). 
 167. Id. at 598 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (citation omitted)). Notably, two of the three 
defendants in Furman and its companion cases were sentenced to death for rape rather than 
murder. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 252–53 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless 
imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to 
the severity of the crime.”168 This rule clearly identifies two separate 
and independent standards for “excessiveness”—failure to serve 
penal purposes and gross disproportionality. A showing that a 
punishment fails to serve penal purposes is sufficient to render it 
unconstitutional, but such a showing is not necessary to show 
unconstitutionality on the separate grounds of disproportionality. 
Further demonstrating that penal purposes and proportionality were 
separate inquiries, the Coker Court acknowledged that legitimate 
penal purposes might sometimes dictate disproportionate 
punishments. “Because the death sentence is a disproportionate 
punishment for rape, it is cruel and unusual punishment within the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment even though it may measurably 
serve the legitimate ends of punishment . . . .”169 When proportionality 
and penal purpose conflicted, it was proportionality that was to guide 
the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis. 
But later decisions seemed to overlook the or in Coker’s rule and 
to collapse the two inquiries. As a result, whether a punishment 
serves a legitimate penal purpose has become an increasingly central 
question—now, it may be the only question—in proportionality 
review. In Enmund v. Florida,170 the Court reversed a death sentence 
for a defendant who participated in a robbery that resulted in murder, 
but did not himself kill or intend to kill.171 To decide whether the 
death penalty was disproportionate in such a situation, the Court 
looked only to penal purpose: “Unless the death penalty when 
applied to those in Enmund’s position measurably contributes to 
[retribution or deterrence], it is ‘nothing more than the purposeless 
and needless imposition of pain and suffering,’ and hence an 
unconstitutional punishment.”172 More recent decisions have followed 
this mode of analysis and treated the question, “Is the punishment 
 
 168. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. The Coker Court referred to Gregg but did not give a page 
citation. In fact, Gregg’s statement of the rule does not directly mention penal purposes: “First, 
the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, the 
punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” Gregg, 428 U.S. 
at 173 (citations omitted). 
 169. Coker, 433 U.S. 592 n.4 (emphasis added). 
 170. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 171. Id. at 788. 
 172. Id. at 798 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 592). 
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disproportionate?” as equivalent to the question “Does this 
punishment serve any legitimate penal purpose?”173 
The equation of disproportionality with failure to serve a penal 
purpose may be one of the most important causes of the Court’s 
increased reluctance to conduct proportionality review of criminal 
sentences. Penal purpose is widely viewed as a matter of legislative 
discretion, and there is great distaste for any judicial review that 
requires courts to supervise or second-guess legislatures’ penological 
aims.174 Courts are slightly less deferential to legislatures in capital 
cases, given the widespread assumption that the unique severity of 
death requires more searching judicial review. But the penological 
purpose approach to proportionality has undoubtedly produced a 
retreat from the notion that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
disproportionately severe prison sentences. 
In Rummel v. Estelle,175 the Court upheld a life sentence imposed 
under a Texas “recidivist statute” for the commission of three felony 
offenses, each of which involved obtaining goods or cash by fraud or 
false pretenses.176 The total value of the property involved in all three 
felonies was about $230.177 Rejecting the defendant’s argument that a 
life sentence was disproportionate to these offenses, the Court noted 
that the proportionality review applied in Furman, Gregg, and Coker 
was limited to the context of capital punishment. “Because a sentence 
of death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter 
how long, our decisions applying the prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishments to capital cases are of limited assistance in deciding the 
constitutionality of the punishment meted out to Rummel.”178 Justice 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion implied that proportionality review had 
 
 173. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1196–98 (2005) (noting that “the 
penological justifications for the death penalty apply to [juveniles] with lesser force than to 
adults” and concluding that “the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders 
under 18”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“We are not persuaded that the 
execution of mentally retarded criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the 
retributive purpose of the death penalty . . . . [W]e therefore conclude that such punishment is 
excessive . . . .”). 
 174. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275–76 (1980) (noting that with respect to 
the appropriate severity of a criminal penalty, “the lines to be drawn are indeed ‘subjective,’ and 
therefore properly within the province of legislatures, not courts”). 
 175. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
 176. Id. at 264–66. 
 177. The first offense involved fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods 
and services. The second offense involved a forged check for $28.36. The third offense involved 
obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. Id. at 265–66. 
 178. Id. at 272. 
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little or no place in the context of prison sentences.179 (The majority 
did acknowledge that a proportionality principle might “come into 
play in the extreme example . . . [in which] a legislature made 
overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.”180) The 
Rummel majority found the Texas statute to be a reasonable exercise 
of legislative discretion to pursue legitimate penological objectives.181 
The statute’s “primary goals are to deter repeat offenders and, at 
some point in the life of one who repeatedly commits criminal 
offenses . . . to segregate that person from the rest of society.”182 The 
point at which permanent segregation is appropriate is “largely within 
the discretion of the punishing jurisdiction.”183 Two years later, in a 
brief opinion in Hutto v. Davis,184 the Court reaffirmed Rummel and 
upheld a forty-year prison sentence for possession of less than nine 
ounces of marijuana.185 
A strong proportionality principle in the context of prison 
sentences made its last, brief stand in Solem v. Helm186 in 1983. After 
stating the general principle that “a criminal sentence must be 
proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been 
convicted,”187 Solem announced a three-part test for proportionality 
that indicated a concern for both the liberty interests and the equality 
interests of individual defendants.188 First, a reviewing court should 
consider “the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the 
 
 179. See id. at 274 (“[O]ne could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this 
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by 
significant terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of the sentence actually 
imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.”). Since Rummel, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas have been the only Justices to state explicitly that the Eighth 
Amendment does not require proportionality in criminal sentences. See Ewing v. California, 538 
U.S. 11, 32 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In my view, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality principle.”); Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966–85 (1991) (Scalia, J., joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist) 
(arguing that the Framers did not intend the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to require 
proportionality). 
 180. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11. 
 181. Id. at 278, 284–85. 
 182. Id. at 284. 
 183. Id. at 285. 
 184. 454 U.S. 370 (1982). 
 185. Id. at 371, 374. The Davis Court quoted extensively from the Rummel opinion and 
offered few new principles to guide proportionality analysis. Id. at 372–74. 
 186. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 187. Id. at 290. 
 188. Id. at 290–92. 
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penalty.”189 This prong of the test draws from the principle expressed 
in Weems, Robinson, and Coker that the liberty interest of an 
individual can be infringed by a punishing state only in proportion to 
the individual’s offense. Next, the Solem Court found, “it may be 
helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the 
same jurisdiction.”190 Finally, “courts may find it useful to compare 
the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other 
jurisdictions.”191 These second two prongs of the test consider both 
liberty interests and equality interests. If the same jurisdiction 
punishes more serious crimes with the same penalty or less serious 
penalties, “that is some indication that the punishment at issue may 
be excessive.”192 
A deeply divided Court stepped away from the Solem test (but 
no majority overruled Solem) in Harmelin v. Michigan.193 Five Justices 
voted to uphold a mandatory life sentence for a first-time offender’s 
possession of 672 grams of cocaine.194 The majority agreed on 
relatively few points, among them that “[t]here can be no serious 
contention, then, that a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and 
unusual becomes so simply because it is ‘mandatory,’”195 and that the 
“individualized” proportionality review necessary for capital 
sentences was not required for a mandatory sentence of life in 
prison.196 Justice Scalia filed a long separate opinion, joined only by 
the Chief Justice, to make a historical argument that “Solem was 
simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality 
guarantee.”197 But the most damage to the liberal, not-necessarily-
penological proportionality principle was probably done by Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence. Justice Kennedy reviewed the Court’s 
proportionality jurisprudence and isolated four principles “that give 
content to the uses and limits of proportionality review.”198 Three of 
these four principles link proportionality to the purposes of 
 
 189. Id. at 290–91. 
 190. Id. at 291. 
 191. Id. at 291–92. 
 192. Id. at 291. 
 193. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 194. Id. at 994–97 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter, JJ.). 
 195. Id. at 995. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 965, 966–94 (opinion of Scalia, J.). 
 198. Id. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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punishment—the liberal, political proportionality principle had all but 
disappeared.199 From his four principles, Justice Kennedy drew a 
“gross disproportionality” standard: “The Eighth Amendment does 
not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. 
Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ to the crime.”200 According to Justice Kennedy, 
reviewing courts should first ask whether the sentence is “grossly 
disproportionate” to the offense, and if it is, only then apply the latter 
two prongs of the Solem test (intra- and interjurisdictional 
comparisons).201 Unless the sentence is grossly disproportionate, a 
court should defer to legislative choices of how best to pursue 
penological goals.202 
The last few Supreme Court decisions to grapple with 
proportionality in the criminal context have been similarly enmeshed 
in considerations of penological purposes. Although the Court has 
not necessarily deferred to legislative determinations of whether 
capital punishment serves legitimate purposes, it tends to defer to 
legislatures when prison sentences are at stake. In Atkins v. 
Virginia,203 the Court emphasized that the Eighth Amendment 
protects individuals from “excessive sanctions”204 and found the death 
penalty unconstitutionally excessive when imposed on any mentally 
retarded defendant.205 The Atkins Court appeared to view “excessive” 
 
 199. The first principle is that “the fixing of prison terms for specific crimes involves a 
substantive penological judgment that, as a general matter, is ‘properly within the province of 
legislatures, not courts.’” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275–76 (1980)). Second, “the Eighth 
Amendment does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.” Id. at 999. Third, 
different theories of sentencing and different sentencing practices “are the inevitable, often 
beneficial, result of the federal structure.” Id. Fourth, “proportionality review by federal courts 
should be informed by ‘objective factors to the maximum possible extent.’” Id. at 1000 (quoting 
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274–75). 
 200. Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 
(1983)). 
 201. Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 202. Id. Justice Kennedy did not specifically limit this revised Solem test to noncapital 
sentences, but his invocations of the value of deference to the legislature focus on the noncapital 
context. See id. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he fixing of prison terms . . . involves a 
substantive penological judgment that, as a general matter, is properly with the province of 
legislatures, not courts.” (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted)); id. at 999 (“[M]arked 
divergences . . . in the length of prescribed prison terms are the inevitable, often beneficial, 
result of the federal structure.”). 
 203. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 204. Id. at 311. 
 205. Id. at 321. 
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as synonymous with “disproportionate,” relying on earlier 
proportionality decisions to demonstrate the right against excessive 
sanctions.206 Penological purpose served as the litmus test for 
proportionality: the Court reasoned that because capital punishment 
could serve neither deterrence nor retribution when imposed on a 
mentally retarded defendant, the death penalty would always be 
unconstitutionally excessive if imposed on such a defendant.207 
In Ewing v. California,208 a case factually similar to Rummel in 
many respects, the Court upheld a life sentence imposed under a 
“three strikes” law on a defendant for theft of golf clubs worth about 
$400 each.209 By Ewing, penological purpose had become the starting 
point of proportionality review, but as a reason to decline to do much 
review at all. The majority opinion began by observing the many 
important purposes served by California’s three strikes statute,210 and 
then emphasized the importance of deference to the legislature on 
questions of penological purpose.211 The Ewing Court then adopted 
the framework described in Justice Kennedy’s Harmelin concurrence, 
announcing that a “narrow proportionality principle” applied to 
“noncapital sentences.”212 Under this narrow principle, Ewing’s 
sentence was not “grossly disproportionate” to his current felony and 
his “long history of felony recidivism.”213 Again, the concept of 
proportionality as a liberal principle independent of penal theory 
seems to have been eclipsed completely by judicial deference to 
legislative penology. The Court emphasized the need for “proper 
deference to the policy judgments that find expression in the 
legislature’s choice of sanctions.”214 This claim is a long way from 
Coker’s recognition that a sentence may be disproportionate “even 
though it may measurably serve the legitimate ends of punishment.”215 
 
 206. Id. at 311. 
 207. Id. at 318–20. 
 208. 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
 209. Id. at 19–20. 
 210. Id. at 14. 
 211. Id. at 24 (“Though three strikes laws may be relatively new, our tradition of deferring 
to state legislatures in making and implementing such important policy decisions is 
longstanding.”). 
 212. Id. at 20 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in judgment)). 
 213. Id. at 29. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 n.4 (1977). 
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Lockyer v. Andrade,216 a habeas case decided alongside Ewing, 
similarly reiterated that “the gross disproportionality principle” 
should govern judicial review of criminal sentences.217 
The “narrow proportionality” principle—perhaps better 
described as the gross disproportionality rule—is limited to 
noncapital sentences. Ewing is not mentioned at all in Roper v. 
Simmons, the Supreme Court’s recent rejection of capital punishment 
for any defendant who was less than 18 years old at the time of the 
offense.218 Instead of Ewing’s rule that only “grossly disproportionate” 
sentences will be struck down, Atkins’s seemingly broader rule 
against “excessive sanctions” serves as the basis for Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion for the Simmons majority.219 After stating that juveniles have 
lesser culpability than adult defendants, Justice Kennedy turned again 
to “penological justifications for the death penalty.”220 “In general we 
leave to legislatures the assessment of the efficacy of various criminal 
penalty schemes,”221 but such deference is not warranted here: 
“neither retribution nor deterrence provides adequate justification 
for imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders.”222 
Again, the reluctance of the Roper majority to defer to legislative 
judgments about how best to serve penological purposes is probably 
limited to the death penalty context. In noncapital criminal 
proportionality decisions of recent years, the Court shows a distaste 
for substituting (or appearing to substitute) judicial assessments of 
 
 216. 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
 217. Id. at 77. The specific question before the Court in Andrade was whether California 
state courts, in upholding Leandro Andrade’s prison term of fifty years to life, had acted 
“contrary to . . . clearly established federal law.” Id. at 70–71 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, observed that “our precedents in this area have not 
been a model of clarity.” Id. at 72. All that is “clearly established,” Justice O’Connor found, is 
the “gross disproportionality principle” articulated in Justice Kennedy’s Harmelin concurrence. 
Id. at 73. The majority found that Andrade’s sentence did not violate the gross 
disproportionality principle. Id. at 77. 
 218. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
 219. Id. at 1190 (“As the Court explained in Atkins, the Eighth Amendment guarantees 
individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.”). Justice Kennedy has authored 
key discussions of proportionality in several contexts: he authored the Roper majority opinion, 
the majority opinion in City of Boerne v. Flores, announcing the “congruence and 
proportionality” requirement for Congressional action under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and a concurrence in Harmelin v. Michigan that first announced the “gross 
disproportionality” test later adopted by the Court in Ewing v. California. 
 220. Id. at 1186. 
 221. Id. at 1196. 
 222. Id. 
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appropriate penal strategy for legislative ones.223 Although the notion 
that “death is different” is often invoked to explain the different 
constitutional rules that govern capital sentencing,224 it is not clear that 
death’s difference would matter with respect to proportionality 
judgments. The Court has not explained why the institutional 
competence concerns raised in the context of arguably 
disproportionate prison sentences are not equally important in the 
context of arguably disproportionate death sentences. 
In fact, the worry about institutional competence is misplaced 
regardless of whether the sentence at issue is prison or death. 
Constitutional proportionality is a requirement of a liberal 
government, a consequence of individual interests in life, liberty, 
property, and equality—and the judiciary plays an important role in 
assessing and protecting those individual interests. Decisions about 
constitutional proportionality need not be (and should not be) 
decisions about penological theory.225 Neither William James 
 
 223. For example, advocates have raised proportionality challenges to lengthy prison terms, 
and especially “life without parole” or LWOP sentences, imposed on juvenile offenders, but 
have had very little success. See, e.g., Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583–85 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(applying the “gross disproportionality” test to reject an Eighth Amendment challenge to a life 
without parole sentence imposed on a juvenile offender). See generally Wayne A. Logan, 
Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 681, 684 (1998) (noting that proportionality challenges to LWOP sentences for juveniles 
have had only “limited” success in state courts and no success in the federal courts). 
 224. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (“Because a sentence of death 
differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how long, our decisions applying 
the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments to capital cases are of limited assistance in 
deciding the constitutionality of the punishment meted out to Rummel.”). 
 225. At the same time, it is unlikely that the Court could enforce constitutional rights with 
no conceptual account of what punishment is. The Constitution speaks of punishment on several 
occasions: Article I, § 3, clause 7; Article I, § 8, clause 6; Article I, § 8, clause 10; Article III, § 3, 
clause 2; amendment VIII; amendment XIII. Consequently, the Court has often had to decide 
whether a legal consequence is a punishment within the meaning of the Constitution. See, e.g., 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is unthinkable that the 
Executive could render otherwise criminal grounds for detention noncriminal merely . . . by 
asserting that it was incapacitating dangerous offenders rather than punishing wrongdoing.”); 
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998) (assessing whether a statute mandating 
currency forfeiture inflicted punishment); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360–66 (1997) 
(assessing whether a sex offender civil confinement statute imposed punishment); Austin v. 
United States, 509 U.S. 602, 619 (1993) (considering which statutory forfeitures should be 
considered punishment); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94–97 (1958) (assessing whether a statute 
providing for denationalization imposes punishment). But we can, and should, define 
punishment without adopting a particular theory of penological purpose. The very notion that a 
“punishment” could be “cruel and unusual” indicates that the Eighth Amendment assumes a 
positive definition of punishment rather than a normative one—in other words, punishment is 
not defined in terms of the purposes that allegedly legitimate it. I develop this argument more 
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Rummel, nor Jerry Buckley Helm, nor Gary Albert Ewing claimed a 
right to be punished retributively, or a right to be punished under a 
Benthamite framework. Instead, each claimed that the power 
exercised over him was an infringement of his liberty interest that 
could not be justified by the scope of his offense. The fuss about 
penological theories in the Court’s recent proportionality decisions is 
a distraction from the underlying claim in each case: that the 
particular sanction exceeds the state’s legitimate power, given the 
offense that is the predicate for the power. 
III.  BEYOND PENOLOGY: SKEPTICISM AND CONDUCT 
Because both the goals of punishment and the means to achieve 
those goals are considered matters of legislative prerogative, the 
“penological purpose” approach to a constitutional proportionality 
requirement in criminal sentencing has greatly narrowed the scope of 
that requirement. This close association of proportionality with the 
purposes of punishment is neither desirable nor necessary.226 In the 
first place, there is little consensus on the appropriate or legitimate 
purposes of punishment. More importantly, to the extent that there is 
broad support for certain professed aims of punishment—such as 
retribution and deterrence—these purposes are defined at a level of 
generality that is unlikely to limit sanctions in any meaningful way. In 
this Part, I first elaborate the practical and philosophical 
shortcomings of penological proportionality, then examine how the 
Court might operationalize the concept of political proportionality by 
focusing on the conduct that constitutes a criminal offense. A focus 
 
fully elsewhere. See Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.  139,  
168–70 (2006). 
 226. Scholars arguing for a stronger constitutional proportionality requirement have, like 
the Court, tended to focus on the purposes of punishment (although academic commentators 
are typically much less deferential to legislative judgments about the goals of punishment and 
the best means to achieve those goals). For example, Professor Frase argues for a 
proportionality analysis that accommodates various penological purposes, including both 
retributive and utilitarian goals. See Frase, supra note 12, at 588–90. Frase identifies two 
different utilitarian proportionality principles—ends proportionality and means 
proportionality—and argues that both should figure into Eighth Amendment analysis. Id. at 
592–97. The argument for a more searching means-ends analysis seems unlikely to persuade the 
Court unless it also addresses the Court’s concern about institutional competence. In Hutto v. 
Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982), the Court explicitly rejected an argument for a “less restrictive 
means” analysis in proportionality review of criminal sentences. See id. at 373 n.2 (rejecting the 
lower court’s “less restrictive means” analysis and noting that this analysis had been implicitly 
rejected in Rummel, because “the lines to be drawn are indeed ‘subjective,’ and therefore 
properly within the province of legislatures, not courts” (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275–76)). 
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on conduct is much more likely to provide a workable proportionality 
principle that the Supreme Court would and could enforce. In fact, 
conduct-based proportionality appears to underlie existing case law 
on the constitutional restrictions on sentencing procedures. More 
generally, the constitutional law of criminal procedure provides a 
model for limitations on penal power that do not presume any 
normative theory of punishment. 
Proportionality is hardly a strictly retributive principle; it is 
clearly demanded by almost every major theory of punishment, 
including an array of utilitarian theories.227 It is equally clear that the 
precise demands of proportionality will vary from one theory to 
another. Some retributive theories may insist that death is the only 
proportional punishment for murder, whereas utilitarian theories 
might prescribe a far less severe sentence. Disagreement about where 
to draw the parameters of proportional punishment does not in itself 
render constitutional proportionality analysis impossible. In the 
narrow context of capital punishment, the Supreme Court has 
accommodated this disagreement by adopting an “overlapping 
consensus”228 approach—sentences that are disproportionate under 
any accepted penological theory are unconstitutional.229 
This overlapping consensus approach to proportionality has led 
the Court to reject the death penalty for certain classes of offenders.230 
But it has not produced meaningful proportionality review of prison 
sentences, and it is unlikely to do so in the future. Notwithstanding 
the efforts of many commentators, including the American Law 
Institute, to use retributivism as a “limiting principle,”231 the claim 
 
 227. See supra Part I. 
 228. “Overlapping consensus” is John Rawls’s term; the Court does not use it. JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 387–88 (1971); RAWLS, supra note 81, at 15. 
 229. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1196 (2005) (“[N]either retribution nor 
deterrence provides adequate justification for imposing the death penalty on juvenile 
offenders.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“We are not persuaded that the 
execution of mentally retarded criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the 
retributive purpose of the death penalty.”). 
 230. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1200 (striking down the death penalty as applied to juvenile 
offenders); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (striking down the death penalty as applied to mentally 
retarded offenders); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (striking down the death 
penalty as applied to defendants who did not kill or intend to kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 600 (1977) (striking down the death penalty as applied to defendants who committed rape 
but not murder). 
 231. See, e.g., MPC SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 9, at 36–37 (noting that the early 
revisions to the MPC borrow from Norval Morris’s theory of “limiting retributivism”); Frase, 
supra note 12, at 590 (“[Limiting retribution], emphasizing limits on excessive measures, is 
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that a prison sentence serves retributive purposes is, for the most 
part, nonfalsifiable. Most retributivist theories focus on the offender’s 
desert, and desert is a highly subjective moral notion that is ill-suited 
to serve as a constitutional standard. It is not surprising that the Court 
has upheld very lengthy prison terms when the state asserts that the 
offender “deserves” such punishment232—how would this claim be 
disproved? Of course, the claim that the death penalty serves no 
retributive purposes for juveniles or the mentally disabled is highly 
contested and perhaps also nonfalsifiable. Thus it is not surprising 
that the Court’s determination that certain classes of offenders will 
never deserve the death penalty has been decried as the unwarranted 
imposition of the Justices’ subjective moral judgments.233 
 
consistent with both the text of the Eighth Amendment and the role of constitutional 
guarantees.”); Morris, supra note 72, at 201 (“My view is different: It is that desert is not a 
defining principle, but is rather a limiting principle.”). 
 232. The two California three strikes cases, Ewing and Andrade, are particularly interesting 
on the question of desert. The state of California identified retribution as well as deterrence and 
incapacitation as purposes of the long mandatory sentences imposed under the three strikes 
statute. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §667(b) (West 1999) (identifying the purposes of the three 
strikes statute, including to “ensure greater punishment”); Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, 
Ewing v. California, at 8, 18, 21 (arguing that the California law is justified due to the “enhanced 
blameworthiness” and “aggravated . . . culpability” of the repeat offender). The Ewing majority 
opinion based its decision to uphold the statute on the California legislature’s alleged decision 
to adopt incapacitation as its central penological aim. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25–26 
(2003) (“When the California Legislature enacted the three strikes law, it made a judgment that 
protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals who have already been convicted 
of at least one serious or violent crime. Nothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits California 
from making that choice.”); see also id. at 14 (“California’s three strikes law reflects a shift in the 
State’s sentencing policies toward incapacitating and deterring repeat offenders who threaten 
the public safety . . . .”). But the notion that the three strikes law was aimed at incapacitation 
instead of retribution was apparently supplied to counsel by one of the Justices at oral argument. 
See Transcript of Oral Argument, Ewing v. California, at *44–45 (“QUESTION: I would have 
thought that your response . . . would have been that . . . it depends on what you want your 
penal goals to be. California has decided that disabling the criminal is the most important 
thing. . . . QUESTION: I mean, proportionality—you necessarily have to look upon what the 
principal objective of the punishment is.”). There is nothing obviously false about the claim that 
repeat offenders, after a certain number of triggering offenses, deserve life imprisonment. 
California made this claim repeatedly before the Supreme Court decided the three strikes law 
was better justified in terms of incapacitation. 
 233. Justice Scalia expresses this view with characteristic vehemence in his dissenting 
opinion in Roper v. Simmons. See 125 S. Ct. at 1230 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the 
majority opinion rests on little more than “a show of hands on the current Justices’ current 
personal views about penology”). But Justice Scalia does not appear to argue that it is 
impossible for judges to determine whether an individual deserves a penalty. Instead, he is as 
certain that capital punishment for juvenile offenders will serve penological purposes as the 
majority is certain that it will not. “The Court’s contention that the goals of retribution and 
deterrence are not served by executing murderers under 18 is . . . transparently false.” Id. at 
1225. 
032006 02_RISTROPH.DOC 4/24/2006  12:27 PM 
2005] PROPORTIONALITY 317 
Whether a sentence serves deterrent purposes is, in theory, a 
more useful inquiry. It is easier to define and measure deterrence 
than it is to define and measure desert. And yet deterrence is also 
unlikely to produce a proportionality standard with enough bite to 
prohibit very lengthy prison sentences. Empirical researchers have 
been investigating the deterrent effects of criminal sanctions for 
years.234 Whether because this research is inconclusive, because it is 
thought to be untrustworthy, or for some other reason, the studies 
have had little impact on criminal justice policy and on constitutional 
standards for criminal law.235 
Penological theory thus produces the following problem: 
Although all or almost all theories of punishment demand some form 
of proportionality, these theories cannot themselves provide a 
constitutional standard for meaningful proportionality review. Rather 
than abandoning proportionality as a constitutional limitation on 
punishment, or becoming resigned to the very weak proportionality 
principle of Ewing, one should consider whether the theory of 
political proportionality developed in Part I might serve as the basis 
of a constitutional standard. Is political proportionality a principle 
capable of producing doctrine? If one were agnostic about the 
purposes of punishment or uncommitted to any particular theory of 
punishment—if one were a penological skeptic—could one 
nevertheless articulate the parameters of proportionality? 
What might be called penological skepticism is a view that 
accepts the practice of punishment as an unavoidable component of a 
political system, but refuses to embrace any particular theoretical 
justification for this type of exercise of state power.236 The penological 
 
 234. See generally DERYCK BEYLEVELD, A BIBLIOGRAPHY ON GENERAL DETERRENCE 
RESEARCH (1980) (collecting statistical research to assess the deterrent effect of punishment). 
 235. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, 
Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal 
Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 29 (1997) (noting the failure of empirical research to influence 
U.S. criminal justice policy); see also Charles S. Lanier & James R. Acker, Capital Punishment, 
the Moratorium Movement, and Empirical Questions, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 577, 591 
(2004) (“Although the empirical research concerning whether the death penalty deters 
homicide more effectively than life imprisonment has been exhaustive and consistent, its role in 
judicial and public policy decisions has been less definitive.”). 
 236. Many scholars have examined various skeptical traditions in American legal thought—
positivism, legal realism, the legal process school, conventionalism, and critical legal studies are 
all products of skepticism in one form or another. See, e.g., Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 
WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1064–67 (1982) (describing the influence of skepticism on legal process 
theorists, conventionalists, positivists, and law and economics scholars, among others); Richard 
A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 827 (1988) (“The skeptical 
032006 02_RISTROPH.DOC 4/24/2006  12:27 PM 
318 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:263 
skeptic is not necessarily a punishment abolitionist, but neither is this 
skeptic a champion of any normative justification for punishment. 
Penological skepticism need not insist that the various justifications 
for punishment are “wrong.”237 In the spirit of all good skeptics, the 
penological skeptic simply doubts. As a consequence, the penological 
skeptic distrusts the coercive penal power and seeks to limit it, but 
does not attempt to base those limitations on a theoretical 
justification of punishment.238 
Can a skeptic have anything to say about punishment under the 
Constitution? In fact, to the extent that there exists a body of 
constitutional criminal law, it is based on penological skepticism. I 
refer, of course, to constitutional criminal procedure. A skeptical 
attitude seems to underlie both the text of the constitutional 
provisions that protect the accused and the jurisprudence that has 
interpreted those provisions.239 The Fourth Amendment prohibition 
of unreasonable searches and seizures assumes no theory of 
punishment; nor does the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. These provisions, along with the Due Process 
requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and the 
Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial, to confrontation, and to 
assistance of counsel, are certainly restrictions on the state’s power to 
 
vein in American thinking about law runs from Holmes to the legal realists to the critical legal 
studies movement . . . .”). 
 237. How would one show that retributivism is “wrong”? One can argue against it on liberal 
grounds—for instance, there is a strong argument that even if punishment is morally justified, 
the liberal state has no business using physical force to satisfy (highly contested) moral 
demands. See Murphy, supra note 89, at 510 (“A complete theory of punishment must concern 
itself not merely with the moral desirability of the goals sought by punishment . . . but also with 
the equally important question of whether the pursuit of these goals is part of the legitimate 
business of the state . . . .”). But for many retributivists, the demand for retribution boils down to 
a first principle—people who do bad things deserve to be punished. This first principle is an 
article of faith; it cannot be proved or disproved but only shared or rejected. 
 238. One could also say that penological skepticism is based on a positive account of 
punishment—punishments are simply the penalties that the state imposes in response to 
crime—rather than a normative account that builds justifying aims into the definition of 
punishment. As noted above, the Eighth Amendment’s contemplation that “punishments” can 
be “cruel and unusual” certainly seems to imply a positive understanding of punishment. See 
supra note 225. 
 239. At any rate, the moral theories that scholars often find to underlie the rules of 
substantive criminal law are not generally associated with the procedural rights of criminal 
defendants. See Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the 
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 553 (1997) (noting that “so-called 
substantive criminal law” and “criminal procedure” are relatively isolated in American law, and 
that it is only substantive criminal law that “associate[s] itself with moral philosophy as best it 
can”). 
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punish: they mandate that the state may not impose punishment 
except when it has satisfied certain procedural requirements. But one 
would be hard-pressed to show that any of these constitutional 
limitations on the penal power assume that punishment will serve 
retributive, deterrent, or other purposes.240 
With respect to substantive limitations on criminal sentences, a 
penological skeptic would clearly reject any proportionality principle 
based on deterrence or retributive theories. But a skeptic could 
embrace political proportionality, a limitation on penal power that 
considers punishment as a practice situated within a larger political 
system that serves many nonpenological goals. A skeptic could 
embrace a proportionality requirement that was an external 
constraint on the practice of punishment and hence unrelated to the 
purpose of penal practices. The constitutional demand that 
individuals must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before 
they are punished is unconcerned with the reasons for which the state 
punishes; it is an external constraint.241 Because skepticism seems to 
underlie the law of constitutional criminal procedure, one might find 
ways to “operationalize” the political proportionality principle in the 
constitutional law of sentencing procedures. 
In a controversial line of cases that has received even more 
attention than the recent Eighth Amendment proportionality 
 
 240. The Supreme Court’s musings on retribution and deterrence just don’t appear in its 
decisions on constitutional criminal procedure. When those decisions attribute a purpose to the 
criminal justice system, that purpose is typically “effective law enforcement.” See, e.g., 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991) (holding that probable cause to search a vehicle 
extends to containers found within the vehicle, and rejecting a distinction between the vehicle 
and containers within it as an impediment to “effective law enforcement”); Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 19 (1985) (“We would hesitate to declare a police practice of long standing 
‘unreasonable’ if doing so would severely hamper effective law enforcement.”); Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983) (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment strikes a balance 
between “the public interest in effective law enforcement and the equally public interest in 
safeguarding individual freedom and privacy”). Neither federal courts nor, to my knowledge, 
academic commentators have attempted to explore or explain in detail what it means to enforce 
a law or what it means for enforcement to be effective. “Effective law enforcement” could 
encompass retributive or utilitarian accounts of punishment, but it need not embrace either of 
those theories. In fact, one could understand “enforcing the law” to be the act of ensuring that 
the law’s terms are observed. Many criminal laws do not even contain explicit proscriptions 
(such as “do not steal”); instead, they define offenses and provide for penalties for those who 
commit those offenses. Thus, to enforce the law could mean no more than to ensure that those 
who commit the specified behavior are given the specified penalty. There is no theory of 
punishment here, no account of why the state attaches penalties to this behavior or what it 
hopes the penalties to accomplish. 
 241. See the discussions of a guilt requirement, supra notes 31 and 94. 
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decisions, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment 
to require that certain facts determinative of the severity of 
punishment be found by a jury rather than by a judge.242 These cases 
stand for the general proposition that the Sixth Amendment is 
implicated not only by the question of guilt or innocence, but also by 
marginal increases in the severity of the penalty. One could read 
these cases to demonstrate an implicit assumption of proportionality: 
If the Constitution contained no proportionality principle, it would 
not be offended by marginal increases in the sentence imposed on a 
defendant who has been proven guilty of some criminal conduct. But 
regardless whether one adopts this reading of the recent Sixth 
Amendment decisions, those decisions provide clues for the 
implementation of a political proportionality principle. 
One of the first decisions in this line of cases, Apprendi v. New 
Jersey,243 established that any fact (other than the fact of a prior 
conviction) “that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”244 After an incident in which 
Charles Apprendi fired on an African American family in Vineland, 
New Jersey, Apprendi pled guilty to second-degree possession of a 
firearm, an offense with a statutory penalty range of five to ten 
years.245 The trial judge held an evidentiary hearing and found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Apprendi’s offense had been 
motivated by racial bias.246 Under a New Jersey “hate crime” law that 
permitted the imposition of enhanced sentences for racially motivated 
crimes, the trial judge sentenced Apprendi to twelve years on the 
firearm possession count.247 The Supreme Court found that this 
 
 242. This line of cases began in 1998 with Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 
(1998), and has since produced six other Supreme Court decisions: Jones v. United States, 526 
U.S. 227 (1999); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 
545 (2002); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); 
and United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). The Court addressed similar issues in Monge 
v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998), but decided that case primarily on Double Jeopardy Clause 
grounds rather than Sixth Amendment grounds. 
 243. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 244. Id. at 490. Although the Apprendi majority referred repeatedly to the right to a jury 
trial, it rested its analysis on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and not explicitly 
on the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 469, 476. 
 245. Id. at 469–70. Apprendi was charged with, and pled guilty to, other offenses as well, but 
only the constitutionality of the sentence on the firearm possession count was at issue before the 
Supreme Court. Id. at 470, 474. 
 246. Id. at 470–71. 
 247. Id. at 471. 
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sentence violated Apprendi’s due process right to a jury 
determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Arguably, there is an assumption of proportionality that 
underlies the Court’s Apprendi analysis. The Constitution has long 
been understood to require that guilt of a “crime” must be proven to 
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.248 In Apprendi, the Court used the 
severity of the penalty (or more specifically, a marginal increase in 
the severity of the penalty) to determine what constituted a “crime” 
and therefore what had to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Since racial hatred was the basis of an increased sentence, 
racial hatred must be (in effect if not in label) an element of the 
offense for which Charles Apprendi was punished. Apprendi thus 
assumes a necessary relationship between the definition of a crime 
and the quantity of the penalty. The principle of proportionality 
likewise insists on a relationship between the scope of an offense and 
the severity of the penalty. But in most theories of proportionality, 
the crime is defined first, and a proportional sentence is then 
prescribed. Apprendi reversed that analysis and used increases in 
penalties to determine changes in the substantive definition of an 
offense.249 
I would not overemphasize the demand for proportionality in the 
sentencing decisions. Standing alone, the assumption of 
proportionality in Apprendi and subsequent sentencing decisions 
does not reveal whether the Constitution has any substantive (as 
opposed to procedural) proportionality requirement. Read narrowly, 
these cases stand only for the proposition that if facts trigger an 
 
 248. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975) (holding that because Maine law 
provided that “heat of passion on sudden provocation” reduced murder to manslaughter, the 
prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of such passion); In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects 
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). 
 249. This reversal of typical proportionality reasoning is most clear in Justice Thomas’s 
Apprendi concurrence. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring). After noting that 
“[t]his case turns on the seemingly simple question of what constitutes a ‘crime,’” id., Justice 
Thomas analyzed historical evidence and concluded that “a ‘crime’ includes every fact that is by 
law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment,” id. at 518. The Court has extended the 
Apprendi analysis to capital sentencing, holding that facts necessary to the imposition of a death 
sentence must be found by a jury, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002), and to state and 
federal sentencing guideline statutes, holding that mandatory guidelines are unconstitutional 
insofar as they allow judges to find “sentencing factors” that increase the penalty beyond the 
maximum that could be imposed in the absence of the sentencing factor, United States v. 
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756–57 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004). 
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increase in the maximum penalty imposed on an individual, those 
facts must be evaluated in accordance with the procedural protections 
of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. After all, Apprendi says 
nothing about whether two years or fifty years is a more appropriate 
enhancement for racial bias. It says only that if racial bias results in 
any increase beyond the penalty that could be imposed in the absence 
of racial bias, then racial bias must be proven to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Thus one might adopt the view that any penalty prescribed by 
the legislature is constitutionally acceptable as long as the jury 
determines all facts relevant to that penalty. Just as the Constitution 
provides few if any a priori restrictions on what conduct may be 
criminalized, it provides few if any a priori restrictions on what 
penalty may be attached to criminalized conduct. This may well be 
the view of Justices Thomas and Scalia, given that each voted with the 
majority in Apprendi and has also rejected an Eighth Amendment 
proportionality requirement.250 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in 
Blakely v. Washington flirts with proportionality concerns, but may 
ultimately decide that jury participation eliminates any risk of 
disproportionality.251 Consider Justice Scalia’s rejection of “legislative 
labeling” as an attempt to evade the requirement that juries 
determine guilt: 
[One alternative] is that the jury need only find whatever facts the 
legislature chooses to label elements of the crime, and that those it 
labels sentencing factors—no matter how much they may increase 
the punishment—may be found by the judge . . . . [A] judge could 
sentence a man for committing murder even if the jury convicted 
him only of illegally possessing the firearm used to commit it—or of 
making an illegal lane change while fleeing the death scene. Not 
even Apprendi’s critics would advocate this absurd result. The jury 
could not function as circuitbreaker in the State’s machinery of 
justice if it were relegated to making a determination that the 
defendant at some point did something wrong, a mere preliminary 
to a judicial inquisition into the facts of the crime the State actually 
seeks to punish.252 
 
 250. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 32 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring); Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 966–94 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.). As far as I am aware, no Justice has explicitly 
contemplated a Sixth Amendment proportionality requirement. 
 251. 542 U.S. 296, 308–09 (2004). 
 252. Id. at 306–07 (citation omitted). 
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It is difficult to say what is “absurd” about a murder sentence 
(presumably, a very severe sentence) for an illegal lane change if not 
its disproportionality. Thus, one could read this passage to evoke a 
concern for substantive proportionality—a worry that there is 
something necessarily wrong with the imposition of a murder-sized 
sentence for an illegal lane change. 
One could argue, however, that Justice Scalia is concerned not 
with substantive proportionality but with sentences whose 
proportionality has not been properly evaluated through legislative 
and judicial processes. On this view, judgments about the severity of 
criminal sentences must be made by democratically accountable 
legislatures and sanctioned by juries. Apprendi itself suggests such an 
argument. As the Apprendi majority acknowledged in a footnote, 
states could try to satisfy Apprendi’s rule without actually increasing 
the facts that prosecutors must prove to juries: “[A] State could, 
hypothetically, undertake to revise its entire criminal code . . . 
extending all statutory maximum sentences to, for example, 50 years 
and giving judges guided discretion as to a few specially selected 
factors within that range . . . .”253 But the Apprendi Court was 
relatively unworried about such statutory amendments that would 
simply raise all maximum penalties. “Among other reasons, structural 
democratic constraints exist to discourage legislatures from enacting 
penal statutes that expose every defendant convicted of, for example, 
weapons possession, to a maximum sentence exceeding that which is, 
in the legislature’s judgment, generally proportional to the crime.”254 
In other words, the “substantive content of . . . criminal laws,” 
including statutory penalty ranges, is subject to a “political check on 
potentially harsh legislative action.”255 This reasoning in Apprendi, 
combined with Blakely’s description of the jury as a “circuitbreaker,” 
might suggest that the only constitutional proportionality 
requirement is that decisions about the appropriate scope of criminal 
sentences be made by a democratically elected legislature and 
implicitly ratified by a criminal jury through its findings of fact. 
There are significant flaws in the argument that the majoritarian 
process and jury trials will, independently or in tandem, be sufficient 
to ensure proportionality in criminal sentencing. In the first case, 
 
 253. 530 U.S. at 490 n.16. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 491 n.16 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 228–29 n.13 (1977) 
(Powell, J., dissenting)). 
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criminal justice policy is often dictated by factors other than simple 
majority preferences.256 Furthermore, limits on some extremely severe 
penalties may be desirable notwithstanding popular support for them, 
given that the criminal law is a classic example of an area in which 
majorities are likely to disregard the rights and interests of 
individuals. With respect to the claim that juries can serve as 
circuitbreakers to ensure proportional sentences, it is hard to see 
what could prompt the jury to throw the switch and break the circuit. 
It is unlikely to be the fact that harsh sentencing consequences will 
follow from certain factual findings, for in most cases juries will not 
have this information. In most U.S. jurisdictions, jurors are not 
informed of the specific penalties that attach to a charged offense.257 
In fact, courts often deny defendants’ explicit requests that the jury be 
instructed of mandatory minimum penalties.258 Thus, though 
democratic and legal processes may provide some protection for 
individual proportionality interests, this process-based protection is 
inadequate, and the judiciary has a role to play in enforcing a 
substantive (and political, nonpenological) proportionality 
requirement. 
Even if the recent sentencing cases add no further support for 
such a substantive requirement,259 they are nonetheless instructive on 
the matter of how to implement it. These sentencing decisions 
demonstrate a mode of constitutional analysis that measures crimes, 
and their constitutional significance, without any reference to 
penological purpose. More specifically, these cases elaborate a 
 
 256. Professor Franklin Zimring has argued that even “populist” legislation such as 
California’s three strikes law does not exactly originate from a spontaneous groundswell of 
majority support. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS, & SAM KAMIN, 
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 160–61 
(2001) (arguing that it is wrong to see public opinion as either “solely an input” or “solely an 
output” of the political process that determines crime policy, and suggesting that choices by 
political leaders sometimes shape public opinion on crime); see also id. at 166 (“The relative 
importance of crime as a government issue will also vary over time, and much of that variance 
will be produced by developments in noncrime issues” such as war or economic recession.). 
 257. See, e.g., Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings about 
Apprendi, 82 N.C. L. REV. 621, 670 (2004) (“In our system, jurors in general are not given 
information about punishments, so all they can do is make assumptions about the likely 
sentence.”). 
 258. For a collection of such cases, see Kristen K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: 
Instructing the Jury about Mandatory Sentencing Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1245 
n.85 (1995) (citing cases). 
 259. As explained in Part II, supra, there is precedent for the notion of political 
proportionality in other doctrinal areas, including the Court’s exactions jurisprudence, its 
limitations on punitive damages, and its pre-1980 Eighth Amendment decisions. 
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constitutional notion of guilt that is based not on retribution (or any 
other penological theory) but on actual conduct and mental state. 
Conduct-based guilt long preceded Apprendi, but these recent cases 
are unusual in their effort to deconstruct guilt from one generalized 
category into more nuanced degrees. 
The Constitution does not explicitly mandate that only the guilty 
be punished, but it is well settled that the Due Process Clause 
requires proof of guilt as a condition of punishment.260 “Guilt,” in 
constitutional terms, is neither a strictly psychological state (though it 
may contain a mens rea requirement) nor an assessment of moral 
blameworthiness.261 It is based on conduct and intent: one is guilty if 
one has engaged in proscribed conduct with a specified intent, or if 
one has failed to engage in required conduct with a specified intent.262 
Constitutional guilt can be assessed only in reference to a specific 
criminal offense, and guilt has not traditionally been assessed in 
degrees.263 For any given offense, the accused is either guilty or not 
guilty. And, of course, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments allow a 
defendant to demand that this guilt be proven to a jury rather than 
found by a judge. 
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker all looked beyond the simple fact 
that the defendant was found guilty of something to determine the 
precise offense and thus the relative degree of criminal guilt. A 
defendant who is found guilty (in constitutional terms) only of 
weapon possession cannot be punished with a sentence reserved for 
those who possess weapons and are also racially biased. In short, the 
 
 260. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 699–700 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–62 
(1970). 
 261. This distinction is particularly clear in capital punishment proceedings, which are 
divided into a “guilt phase” (at which the jury is instructed to decide whether the defendant 
engaged in conduct that constitutes a capital offense) and the “penalty phase,” sometimes called 
the “culpability phase” (at which the jury is instructed to determine whether the defendant is 
sufficiently morally blameworthy to deserve the death penalty). 
 262. Whether a crime of omission must have an intent requirement was the issue in Lambert 
v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). The Supreme Court suggested that intent or at least 
constructive knowledge of a legal duty was indeed a requirement—a legislature could not create 
strict liability crimes of omission. 
[C]onduct alone without regard to the intent of the doer is often sufficient . . . . But 
we deal here with conduct that is wholly passive—mere failure to register. It is unlike 
the commission of acts, or the failure to act under circumstances that should alert the 
doer to the consequences of his deed. 
Id. at 228. 
 263. Offenses are, of course, divided into degrees: first-degree larceny, second-degree 
larceny, and so forth. But with respect to any given offense, guilt is all-or-nothing. 
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legislative definition of offenses and sentencing factors—of relevant 
types of conduct and mental states—gives the Court a way to make 
comparisons between different degrees of guilt. 
Legislative definitions of relevant conduct and intent could also 
serve as the basis of constitutional proportionality review, especially 
in the context of comparative review as required by Solem v. Helm. 
Recall that under the three-part test in Solem, a court must consider 
(1) the gravity of the offense and the severity of the penalty, (2) 
sentences imposed on other offenders in the same jurisdiction, and 
(3) sentences imposed on similar offenders in other jurisdictions.264 
The focus on conduct and intent in the Apprendi line of cases helps 
clarify how reviewing courts would apply the second and third parts 
of this test. The more extensive the criminal conduct, the more 
expansive the penal power.265 
Of course, this type of offense-to-offense comparison will be 
easiest (and least controversial) when offenses identify roughly 
similar types of conduct as necessary elements. But this will be the 
case most of the time; there are few sui generis crimes. So even 
though many criminal offenses are arguably incommensurable—who 
is to say whether assault is worse than drug distribution?—courts 
doing proportionality review could compare assaults to other assaults 
and leave to the legislature the control over the relative severity of 
sentences for drug offenses in comparison to assault sentences. 
The first factor of the Solem test is, of course, inevitably 
subjective to some degree. For those who want proportionality review 
to exclude all normative judgments, there is not a wholly satisfactory 
answer to this problem. But two observations suggest that the 
problem is hardly so acute as to require abandonment of judicial 
proportionality review. First, the more fixed, concrete aspects of the 
Solem test—intra- and interjurisdictional review—can serve as the 
primary basis of proportionality judgments. One way to determine 
whether a penalty is too severe for a given offense is to ask whether 
the state is willing to impose that penalty on everyone who is 
convicted of that offense. If the state is unwilling to impose a penalty 
 
 264. 463 U.S. 277, 290–92 (1983); see also supra Part II.C. 
 265. For a fascinating recent example of a similar approach, see United States v. Angelos, 345 
F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004). Considering a proportionality challenge brought under the 
Equal Protection Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment, the district court found a 
mandatory sentence enhancement for use of a firearm to be irrational (but, perhaps concerned 
with being overruled on appeal, the court ultimately imposed the irrational sentence). Id. at 
1263. 
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uniformly, then it is probably safe to conclude that the penalty is 
disproportionately severe. 
Second, the admittedly subjective requirement that the severity 
of the penalty correspond to the severity of the offense is akin to the 
requirements of proportionality in other doctrinal contexts. In 
reviewing civil punitive damage awards, the courts consider the 
“reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct” in relation to the 
damage award.266 Analogously, the test for exactions under the 
Takings Clause requires a reviewing court to consider whether the 
exaction is proportionate to the impact of the proposed property 
development.267 The requirement of proportionality is no more 
objective in these contexts or in the context of congressional power 
under the Fourteenth Amendment than it is in the context of criminal 
sentences.268 In all of these situations, the nature of liberal democracy 
and the need to define limits on governmental power require that 
judges conduct proportionality review even in the presence of 
metaphysical uncertainties. 
It should be reemphasized that political proportionality would 
focus on the limits of the power to punish—not on the precise severity 
of punishment most appropriate to an individual defendant. An 
important consequence of this focus, and an important limitation on 
proportionality challenges, is that individual defendants would have 
to show that their sentences exceed the state’s power over their 
conduct. In other words, successful proportionality challenges would 
probably be limited to cases in which defendants could persuade a 
court that the upper limit of a statutory penalty range was facially 
invalid. A political proportionality principle is an effort to limit penal 
power based on the conduct that was criminalized—not based on the 
particular characteristics of each individual defendant. Or, put 
differently, if proportionality is not a matter of individual desert, then 
a defendant could not successfully challenge his sentence by arguing, 
“Given my particular circumstances, I don’t deserve this penalty.” 
 
*          *          * 
 
 
 266. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
 267. See supra notes 99–101. 
 268. See supra Part II.A., which discusses City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) and 
subsequent applications of its “congruence and proportionality” test. 
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Individual liberty is a fundamental right, both as a matter of 
liberal theory and as a matter of American constitutional doctrine. 
Disputes about the definition of liberty abound, but it seems clear 
that no matter how the term is defined, incarceration is an 
infringement of individual liberty. In the context of incarceration, 
however, the “fundamental right” status of liberty seems to be 
forgotten or neglected. As Sherry Colb has noted, the right to be free 
from incarceration is not protected with the same degree of judicial 
scrutiny as other fundamental rights.269 Although freedom from bodily 
restraint is classified as one of the Constitution’s “fundamental 
rights,”270 violations of which ordinarily incur strict scrutiny, prison 
sentences have been subjected to heightened scrutiny only when they 
also implicate other fundamental rights, such as First Amendment 
speech rights271 or Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due 
Process rights.272 Instead, the courts seem to assume that “if the 
government may prevent an activity, because there is no fundamental 
right to engage in that activity, then the government may elect . . . to 
deprive people of their liberty from incarceration as a penalty for 
engaging in the activity.”273 Although incarceration is clearly a 
deprivation of the right to be free from bodily restraint, the state need 
not satisfy the compelling interest or least restrictive means tests to 
justify its choice to incarcerate individuals who engage in particular 
activities. 
Part of the problem, as suggested in Part I, is that criminal law 
and punishment are cordoned off from the rest of liberal 
constitutional politics, both as a matter of theory and as a matter of 
legal doctrine. Except in rare circumstances, such as analyses of civil 
 
 269. Sherry F. Colb, Freedom From Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different From All 
Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 785 (1994) (“An individual’s interest in being free of 
physical confinement is a fundamental right . . . . [T]his fundamental right has been treated 
differently from all other fundamental rights under the [Supreme] Court’s jurisprudence.”). 
 270. See id. at 787–88 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), and other cases 
that classify freedom from bodily restraint as part of the “fundamental right” to liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause). 
 271. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (applying “the most exacting 
scrutiny” to a Texas criminal statute prohibiting destruction of a venerated object, and reversing 
the defendant’s sentence of one year in prison and a $2000 fine for burning an American flag 
(quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988))). 
 272. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (applying the “most rigid scrutiny” 
to reverse criminal sentences under a Virginia statute that prohibited interracial marriage 
(quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944))). 
 273. Colb, supra note 269, at 803. 
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disobedience,274 those suspected or convicted of breaking the law are 
treated as lesser beings without the ordinary rights and liberties of 
individuals in a constitutional democracy. The enumeration of 
specific protections for criminal defendants in the Bill of Rights, 
intended no doubt to ameliorate this problem, may actually aggravate 
it: judges, policymakers, and academic commentators tend to focus 
obsessively on the rights afforded specifically to criminal defendants 
and forget that as persons, these defendants also have the same basic 
human rights that are held by persons not under the scrutiny of a 
punishing authority. In thinking about the scope of the power to 
punish, it is necessary to situate that power in the context of the larger 
political system. When a liberal state punishes, it must do so 
consistently with the individual rights and interests understood to be 
fundamental. 
But even as one situates the power to punish in its larger political 
context, it is also necessary to disaggregate that power in order to 
limit it effectively. Punishing is a complex practice that involves 
cooperation among all three branches of government and the 
exercises of different powers in each branch. The legislature defines 
activity as criminal and prescribes a range of penalties; the judiciary 
oversees the adjudication of guilt and the determination of sentence; 
the executive prosecutes individual defendants and later imposes the 
actual sentence—usually, by incarcerating. Attempts to protect 
individual defendants’ rights at one point in the penal process are 
likely to be ineffective unless the process is viewed as a whole and the 
distinct branches can effectively check one another’s power. 
These types of concerns surface in arguments for the 
“constitutionalization” of substantive criminal law.275 In fact, almost 
thirty years ago, scholars calling for a constitutional substantive 
criminal law foresaw the quandary that would result if legislative 
 
 274. Civil disobedients get much more respect than “ordinary” criminals. Analyses by legal 
scholars and philosophers fully recognize the civil disobedient’s continuing interest in liberty, 
even after an intentional violation of the law. For example, some theorists wonder whether one 
who breaks the law for ideological purposes has an obligation to submit to punishment. See, e.g., 
A.D. Woozley, Civil Disobedience and Punishment, 86 ETHICS 323, 327 (1976) (“If we cannot 
make the moral demand of a civil disobedient that he await punishment, then we cannot refuse 
to call a man a civil disobedient on the ground that he does not await his punishment.”). 
 275. See Hart, supra note 13, at 411 (questioning the wisdom of relying on the “legislature’s 
sense of justice” rather than prescribing substantive constitutional limitations “on the kinds of 
conduct that can be declared illegal”); Stuntz, supra note 13, at 19 (“The normative argument 
that justifies the constitutionalization of criminal procedure justifies substantive constitutional 
restraints as well.”). 
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power to define crimes were left unchecked. One problem these 
scholars identified was that the procedural protections of the Bill of 
Rights could be circumvented through creativity in the definitions of 
criminal offense.276 For example, Professor Ronald Allen expressed 
the fear that legislatures would engage in “semantic 
gamesmanship,”277 declining to label some of the categories of 
conduct that they wanted to punish as “elements” in order to avoid 
the requirement that prosecutors prove that conduct to a jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt. In short, Allen foresaw the problem that Blakely 
and Booker finally recognized. But Allen’s analysis also suggests that 
Blakely and Booker are incomplete solutions. Not surprisingly, 
Allen’s own antidote to “semantic gamesmanship” was a kind of 
proportionality review.278 Process-based protections of liberty can be 
undermined by a legislature with unfettered power to criminalize 
conduct. Accordingly, the procedural protections for proportionality 
defended in Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker need to be supplemented 
with a substantive proportionality requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial reluctance to conduct proportionality review has been 
the unfortunate result of a mistaken association between 
proportionality and particular penological theories. In fact, 
proportionality reflects basic liberal principles that have little to do 
with penology. A state incursion into individual liberty must be 
justified with specific reference to the conduct that prompts the 
incursion. Furthermore, impositions of punishment must adhere to 
the general rule that similarly situated individuals are equal before 
the law. 
Whatever value there may be in criminal laws passed by 
democratically elected legislatures, the sanction is inevitably an 
interference with the bodily freedom (and sometimes, with the very 
 
 276. See, e.g., Ronald Jay Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court, and the Substantive 
Criminal Law—An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEX. L. REV. 269, 
291 (1977) (“The only clear directive in Wilbur is that Maine, in formulating its criminal statutes 
ran afoul of some unarticulated constitutional requirement.”); John Calvin Jeffries & Paul B. 
Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 
1325, 1328–33 (1979) (“Winship purported to fix the burden of proof as a matter of 
constitutional law. To make the scope of that doctrine depend on legislative allocation of the 
burden of proof is to assure the point in issue and thus reduce Winship to a circularity.”). 
 277. Allen, supra note 276, at 290. 
 278. Id. at 296–98. 
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biological existence) of an individual. But bodily freedom and 
biological existence are fundamental individual rights, and under 
ordinary circumstances, liberal governments are expected not to 
infringe on these rights and even to act affirmatively to protect them. 
Necessary and appropriate as criminal sentences may sometimes be, 
they must be meted out in a manner consistent with these basic liberal 
principles. It is probably the case that a liberal government cannot 
avoid exercising force against the bodies of some of its subjects in 
some circumstances. But the power to do so must be constrained if 
the punishing state is to remain a liberal state, and the best way to 
constrain the penal power may be through a liberal principle of 
proportionality. 
